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2	<u>STATEMENT OF</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
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6	Legislative Counsel;	
7	Central Intelligence Agency	2084
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10	United States Army	2124
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13	Federal Bureau of Investigation	2130
14	Captain E. P. Hylant,	
15	Head of the Security Branch; accompanied by	
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17	both of the Office of Naval Intelligence	2144
18	Lieutenant Colonel F. I. McGarraghy,	
19	Chief of the General Investigations Division	
20	of the Director of Special Investigations,	
21	Office of Inspector General of the United	
22	States Air Force; accompanied by	
23	Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hurley	2154
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EXECUTIVE SESSION - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FILE NO. _____

Friday, July 14, 1950

United States Senate,
Investigations Subcommittee,
Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to S. Res. 280, 81st Congress, Second Session, in room 357, Senate Office Building, Senator Clyde R. Hoey, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

PRESENT:

SENATOR CLYDE R. HOEY, Democrat, North Carolina
SENATOR JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Democrat, Arkansas
SENATOR KARL E. MUNDT, Republican, South Dakota
SENATOR MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Republican, Maine
SENATOR ANDREW F. SCHOEPPPEL, Republican, Kansas

ALSO PRESENT:

FRANCIS D. FLANAGAN, Chief Counsel
COLONEL EDWARD J. WALSH, Liaison Officer
RUTH YOUNG, Clerk

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The Chairman. The subcommittee will be in order.

Members of the committee, I have a very brief opening statement which I thought might go into the record.

Under S. Res. 280 of the 81st Congress, Second Session, this subcommittee has been directed to undertake an investigation of the alleged employment of homosexuals in the Government service. As soon as the investigation called for in this resolution was referred to the subcommittee, I directed the staff to begin a study of the various problems involved.

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1 At this time it appears that the logical method of handling
2 this investigation is to study and take testimony from qualified
3 witnesses concerning the various separate problems involved in
4 the inquiry.

5 At this first executive meeting we are going to consider
6 the specific problem as to whether or not homosexuals and other
7 sex perverts in the Government service constitute bad security
8 risks. To this end we have arranged to call before the sub-
9 committee representatives of the various intelligence agencies
10 of our Government, who, we believe, are in the best position
11 to consider matters of internal security. In the very near
12 future we shall also call other witnesses who will furnish us
13 information on the security aspects of homosexuality. These
14 later witnesses shall include representatives of the President's
15 Loyalty Board, private bonding companies, and the Police
16 Department.

17 Other aspects of the problem of the employment of homo-
18 sexuals in the Government, such as medical aspects, the admin-
19 istrative methods used in the various departments in dealing
20 with these individuals and similar matters, will be considered
21 separately as soon as practicable. Today's hearing will be
22 confined to taking testimony from representatives of our
23 Government intelligence agencies, including the Central
24 Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
25 the Armed Services.

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1 Now, the first witness today will be Rear Admiral Roscoe
2 H. Hillenkoetter.

3 Admiral, you may identify yourself and then proceed with
4 your testimony.

5 STATEMENT OF ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER,
6 DIRECTOR; ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER L. PFORZHEIMER,
7 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL; BOTH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Mr. Chairman, I am Director of the
9 Central Intelligence Agency, and I have a statement here I would
10 like to read and, of course, answer any questions on it, sirs,
11 that occur during the statement or afterwards.

12 Senator McClellan. Does the Central Intelligence Agency
13 cover all branches of the Armed Services?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

15 Senator Mundt. And the State Department?

16 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, all Government agencies.

17 Senator McClellan. It covers the whole Government?

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

19 Senator Smith. You are the over-all director of the Central
20 Intelligence Agency?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Flanagan. I think it might be helpful to the committee
23 if you explained briefly the jurisdiction of your agency, compared
24 with the jurisdiction of, say, the FBI and ONI and G2.

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I have that in the statement, which

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1 will explain it, but briefly and in general we operate only
2 outside the United States. The FBI is inside the United States.
3 Our functions are very similar outside the United States, except
4 that Central Intelligence Agency does not have any police or
5 subpoena powers. We just collect intelligence, we are the
6 coordinators of intelligence for all agencies of the Government.

7 Senator Schoeppel. Do you collaborate with the FBI on
8 matters that relate themselves to the domestic or continental
9 United States?

10 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir. We are in very close
11 touch with them continually, but in general that is the dividing
12 line. The FBI is in the States and territories and we are
13 outside.

14 As this is my first appearance before your committee, I
15 would like to point out that the Central Intelligence Agency was
16 established under the provisions of the National Security Act of
17 1947. The Agency coordinates all of the foreign intelligence
18 activities of the United States and also includes among its
19 functions the operation of American clandestine intelligence
20 abroad.

21 In addition, we are charged with the production of national
22 intelligence estimates for the President, the National Security
23 Council, the components of the Department of Defense and other
24 appropriate officials of the Government.

25 These intelligence estimates are our evaluated opinion as to

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1 affairs or situations abroad and the capabilities of foreign
2 countries in so far as they affect the national security.

3 I would like to bring this point out particularly because
4 a week or so ago I testified before an Appropriations Committee
5 and there was a leak out to the press, and the leak was wrong.
6 It said we did not evaluate and we got lots of unfavorable
7 publicity, and we could not answer, must not answer, but they
8 were 180 degrees off.

9 We do evaluate. I think the error came in the fact that
10 during the testimony we said we could not endorse or oppose any
11 policy of the United States because that will slant our own
12 intelligence.

13 So we take no sides with any policy of what the United
14 States does, but we do gather facts, give them to the President,
15 and interpret those.

16 However, the press came out with lots of brickbats, said
17 we did not interpret, we should interpret, and everything else.
18 It was a complete misunderstanding on the thing.

19 Senator Smith. May I just ask a question there? Does the
20 report go to the President only?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. The reports go to the President
22 and the Security Council. The Security Council is the
23 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Vice President,
24 and the Chairman of the Security Resources Board, and, in
25 addition, they go to the Army, the Navy, Air, State, or at times,

1 when other departments are concerned, Commerce, Interior, and
2 Agriculture if they are concerned.

3 Senator Smith. Always to the President and the Security
4 Council and to those who are affected?

5 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes.

6 Senator Smith. Thank you.

7 Senator McClellan. On the matter of evaluating, as I
8 understand it, the FBI simply collects the facts. It does not
9 recommend a prosecution, we will say, or not. It simply collects
10 the facts and submits the information to the Justice Department.

11 When you use the term, that you evaluate the facts, do you
12 draw a conclusion and report that conclusion?

13 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, very definitely. I mean
14 we will report the conclusions, but we do not report any conclu-
15 sions saying that the United States should counter this thing
16 by doing this or that.

17 Senator McClellan. You do not follow your conclusions with
18 recommendations as to what action should be taken?

19 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

20 The Chairman. You just interpret the facts you find?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, and very definitely do
22 not make any conclusion as to what action we should take, because
23 then you get into --

24 Senator McClellan. Policy.

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. And then you decide on a course of

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1 action you think is right and then you slant your intelligence
2 to make your own policy, outright.

3 Senator Mundt. To make the analogy clear cut and concise,
4 in taking a loyalty case, for example, the FBI does not arrive
5 at a point where it says, "Fire the man." It simply makes the
6 evidence available to the Attorney General.

7 In your shop, if you are checking on the loyalty of some-
8 body and you are convinced he should be removed, as I understand
9 it, by the term "evaluate," your report would say, "In the
10 opinion of CIA, this man is a bad security risk and should be
11 removed."

12 Admiral Hillenkoetter. On that, yes. That is only a minor
13 part of ours.

14 Senator Mundt. I understand that.

15 Admiral Hillenkoetter. In evaluation we would put in, say
16 in the case of Formosa, for a year we would put in there whether
17 Formosa can be defended or not. In no case do we say we ought
18 to defend it or not. That is not our pigeon. Somebody else has
19 to decide that.

20 Senator Mundt. I see.

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. The functions of CIA are completely
22 in the field of foreign intelligence. We have no police powers
23 or internal security responsibilities whatsoever. We are not a
24 policy-making agency. We merely supply the facts and our
25 evaluations of these facts, so that appropriate officials of the

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1 Government have the best available information upon which to
2 base national policies.

3 The reason we are not a policy-making agency is quite
4 sound, for it has always been the case when an intelligence
5 agency dabbles in policy, it commences to slant its intelligence
6 in support of the policies it favors.

7 In presenting my testimony this morning, I wish to point
8 out it is based on twenty-odd years' experience in intelligence.

9 I was assistant naval attache and naval attache in Paris
10 and Vichy, France, as Admiral Nimitz' intelligence officer
11 during the war, and since 1 May 1947 Director of Central
12 Intelligence.

13 This subject that comes up this morning on perversions --
14 that is a subject that has been discussed for years and always
15 will be discussed, particularly by anybody in intelligence
16 circles.

17 One of the questions asked in the Senate Resolution is
18 whether there is a threat inherent in the employment of such
19 perverts and whether a special threat is raised by their employ-
20 ment in sensitive agencies such as our own.

21 I think the best way I can illustrate that is to give a
22 classic case. It is an old case now, but it is a classic of its
23 kind. I think when that is finished, there will be no doubt as
24 to the fact that perversion presents a very definite security
25 risk.

1 In the early part of this century there was an Austrian,
2 a young Austrian Army officer, named Raedl. He was head of
3 the Austrian intelligence services. He had started working in
4 them and just before the war in 1912 he became the head of the
5 old Austrian government intelligence service.

6 He was honest, which was a little unusual at that time in
7 the Austrian government under the Emperor. There had been lots
8 of malfeasance of funds until he took over. He was a very
9 honest person and did a very good job.

10 One of the regulations set up by the Emperor of Austria
11 was that anyone guilty of homosexuality or perversion was
12 immediately dismissed from the Army, and at that time you had
13 to be a nobleman to be in the Army. It meant immediate dis-
14 missal and being put out of the country.

15 When Captain Raedl started, he built up a very good intelli-
16 gence net in Russia with a lot of penetrations. He did a lot
17 of damage to the Russian intelligence nets in Austria, counter-
18 intelligence, a sort of FBI work as we have it here. He was,
19 all in all, a very excellent person.

20 The Russians found out who he was, and he was the source of
21 their troubles, and they made an all-out effort to learn the
22 details of his personal life. They could not catch him for
23 dishonesty because he was an exceptional case. They observed
24 soon that he was never seen in the company of women and then
25 through a young newsboy they were able to discover that Raedl

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1 was a homosexual and made improper advances to the boy.

2 This was the turning point of the whole case. Under the
3 Austrian standards no officer could be tolerated in the Army if
4 he had a homosexual condition, and if Raedl was denounced, he
5 would have been dismissed and, as a nobleman, kicked out of the
6 court and everything else.

7 The Russians decided to get definite proof to confirm
8 their suspicions and they were able to substitute another news-
9 boy who was in their employ for the original newsboy. This
10 second newsboy was soon able to confirm Raedl's homosexual
11 tendencies.

12 The first idea of the Russians was to denounce Raedl
13 immediately, but on second thought, they said, "You gain nothing
14 by that, you just throw out a good man."

15 During the summer of 1912 they had this second newsboy that
16 they had hired, and he became very intimate with Raedl, and the
17 second newsboy suggested they take a vacation away from Vienna.

18 They went to a hotel in the Tyrol, where a Russian officer
19 was also vacationing, and through this boy the Russians made a
20 copy of the key to Raedl's room and broke into his room and
21 caught him in an act of perversion.

22 The Russians immediately said, "All right, we are going to
23 expose you." Of course, he did not want that, and through the
24 fear of exposure, he agreed to furnish the Russians intelligence
25 which he had by virtue of his position, and he was boss of all

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1 Intelligence in Austria.

2 A woman was arranged as a suitable cutout for the passing
3 of this material, so that Raedl would not learn too much about
4 the Russian side of it. That was just a control of him.

5 As his first assignment, Raedl furnished the Russians with
6 Austrian mobilization plans for the first World War. That was
7 a year before war started in 1913.

8 Over a period of time he doctored or destroyed intelligence
9 reports received from Austrian networks within Russia. At the
10 outbreak of war in 1914 the Austrian and German staffs were
11 completely misinformed as to the Russian mobilization intentions
12 in their plans, and the Russians had the complete Austrian
13 plans and part of the Germans' that the Germans had given to the
14 Austrians.

15 As another continuing example, during Raedl's activities
16 one of the Austrian agents working for him in Warsaw reported
17 that he found out that the Russians had the Austrian mobilization
18 plans. In order to save himself, Raedl told the Russians and
19 then had his own agent killed by the Russians to save himself
20 from exposure.

21 In addition, a colonel in the Russian Army was willing to
22 give some information to the Austrians, and Raedl found out
23 through his job about that, and had to tell the Russians about
24 it, and the Russians shot their own colonel on the thing.

25 In all, he turned over three Austrian agents to the

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1 Austrians for investigation, and they were all killed, all
2 executed. His own agents were killed because he had to do that
3 to keep from being exposed.

4 When war finally broke out, of course, all the Russians
5 had to leave Vienna, and they did not know how to keep in touch
6 with Raedl, and this is how he was caught. They sent an
7 envelope with money in it, and the Russians either did not think
8 that censorship had begun to be in effect at that time, but
9 anyway, censorship was in effect and they found this great sum
10 of money, a considerable sum of money, it amounted to around
11 \$10,000 in our money, the censors found that addressed to
12 Colonel Raedl, who was head of intelligence, addressed to him
13 in a post office box. They were a little suspicious of any
14 great sum like that.

15 So they watched it and watched him come up and get it, and
16 when he came up and got it, they followed him, and they finally
17 gave him a pistol and told him to shoot himself real quickly,
18 which he did. He committed suicide.

19 But the first month of the World War the Russians knew
20 everything about the Austrians they wanted to know, and the
21 Austrians had to make new plans and everything else.

22 Now, this use of a homosexual holding a strategic position
23 is a classic example of the reasons -- I mean it is an old one,
24 but it is known all through intelligence circles -- it is a
25 classic example of why a homosexual, who was in this case the

1 victim of blackmail and fear of exposure, is a dangerous security
2 risk to his own government.

3 The fact that the Russians controlled Raedl, the head of
4 Austrian counter-intelligence, through fear of exposure of his
5 perversion, almost completely neutralized the efforts of the
6 Austrian service as against the Russians for more than a decade.
7 Not only did they have the identities of all Austrian agents
8 in Russia, but in gaining valuable military intelligence and
9 feeding back deception material and false information through
10 Raedl, they put both Austria and Germany at a definite dis-
11 advantage at the opening of World War I.

12 The investigation was so great that practically the entire
13 Austrian general staff had to be kicked out because nobody knew
14 where this thing led to. It was a very tragic condition for
15 any country entering into a big war. Whether Austria was on
16 our side or not, it was a very bad condition.

17 As I said before, on a concrete example of what can be done
18 to a country's security by a homosexual strategically placed,
19 I would like to turn now to general theory as to why we should
20 not employ homosexuals or other moral perverts in positions of
21 trust. I would like to list certain characteristics regarding
22 them. In the first place, an established homosexual relationship
23 involves emotions as strong and usually stronger than a normal
24 love relationship between man and woman.

25 Secondly, there is the known psychological susceptibility

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1 of the passive homosexual -- susceptible particularly to domina-
2 tion by aggressive personalities in any number or in any
3 situation.

4 Thirdly, experience indicates that perverts are vulnerable
5 to interrogation by a skilled questioner. They seldom refuse to
6 talk about themselves, although some will not incriminate anyone
7 else. In addition, homosexuality frequently is accompanied by
8 other exploitable weaknesses, such as psychopathic tendencies
9 which affect the soundness of their judgment, physical cowardice,
10 susceptibility to pressure, and general instability. So, in
11 addition to his homosexuality, a pervert is vulnerable in many
12 other ways.

13 In the fourth place, in virtually every case, despite pro-
14 testations by the perverts that they would never succumb to
15 blackmail, they invariably express considerable concern about
16 covering or concealing the circumstances of their condition.
17 They also exhibit concern as to how much circulation the informa-
18 tion may receive.

19 Fifth, in most cases, either currently or sometime in their
20 past, the individual pervert has been promiscuous and has
21 frequented various hangouts of his brethren, with the result that
22 knowledge of his condition is known to a number of people, who
23 may or may not be aware of his sensitive employment.

24 The comparative ease with which bars, restaurants, or night
25 clubs where perverts congregate can be identified in any

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1 community makes it possible for a recruiting agent to use homo-
2 sexuality as an excuse for the development of a clandestine
3 relationship which can later be directed to espionage purposes,
4 either with or without the knowledge of the subject, either
5 wittingly or unwittingly.

6 In this regard homosexuals have a definite similarity to
7 other illegal groups such as criminals, smugglers, black
8 marketeers, dope addicts, and so forth. They do congregate
9 and they are well known in their own circles.

10 Next, obvious homosexuals with the outward characteristics
11 of femininity, or females with male characteristics, are often
12 difficult to employ because of the effect on their co-workers
13 and the public in general.

14 Some perverts who make a great to-do about their discretion
15 are actually quite indiscreet. They are often too stupid to
16 realize it, or through inflation of their ego or through not
17 letting themselves realize the truth, they are usually the
18 center of gossip, rumor, derision, and so forth.

19 Experience has shown that even where the pervert has the
20 best of intentions to drop the life and go straight, most homo-
21 sexuals eventually revert to type.

22 I might say, parenthetically, that we here in CIA have
23 recently had such an experience in our agency. We employed a
24 man who had no police or public record or recognition as a
25 homosexual. He had been given a full FBI field check before we

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1 took him on to work. We gave him a check with our own people.
2 Nothing turned up. No evidence at all that he was a homosexual.

3 He had made a very considerable effort to avoid it. He
4 had married and had a child.

5 One day not too long ago an opportunity arose in a public
6 washroom, which he could not resist, and all his efforts to go
7 straight were gone in a minute. Of course, it became public
8 knowledge.

9 We found out and fired him right away on the thing. But
10 this fellow, in telling his story, he said that he had tried for
11 about four years. He had been absolutely straight. However,
12 there was one opportunity and it was all gone.

13 Senator Mundt. Is that this recent case that has been in
14 the papers quite a bit?

15 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir. I would like to cite
16 this case to emphasize the fact that it is not always easy to
17 spot the cases, particularly where there has been an effort of
18 a man to go straight and reform or where there is no police
19 record or public indiscretion. Witnesses are usually loath
20 to discuss suspicions, even with the FBI, but it has worked out
21 sooner or later that a break is made, and isolated latent cases
22 of that type develop and sometimes you just cannot catch them
23 for a while.

24 We would never have caught this fellow except this one time.
25 It was four years.

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1 Senator Mundt. Subsequent check disclosed this was not
2 a first offense, as far as he was concerned?

3 Admiral Hillenkoetter. He never had a public record. We
4 questioned him, and he told us, "I was before and for four years
5 now I haven't been, I have married." He had a child, was very
6 contrite and everything. He just admitted that, sir.

7 Speaking for the Agency, we do our best as far as our own
8 Agency is concerned to leave no stone unturned to make certain
9 we do not employ any perverts of any sort, and if we do find
10 them, we get rid of them as fast as we can.

11 To return to the reasons why the pervert is a security
12 risk, the homosexual is extremely vulnerable to seduction by
13 another pervert employed for that purpose by a foreign power,
14 in our particular case, or by anyone. Such an agent would not
15 have to be a homosexual, but could simulate the characteristics
16 and gain access to the acquaintance of the pervert he selected
17 for his victim by acting as a member of the group.

18 Another reason is that certain perverts are extremely
19 defiant in their attitude towards society. They do not want to
20 change their habits. They feel they are different and on a
21 higher plane than the heterosexual. This mental attitude can
22 be a very dangerous one, as it can be projected to a defiance of
23 society in other respects, including disloyalty. A man figures
24 he is better than the rest of the world and that, therefore, the
25 laws of the rest of the world do not apply to him, including

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1 disloyalty.

2 We have found also another reason is that homosexuals are
3 usually extremely gullible.

4 Even the most brazen perverts are usually under consider-
5 able tension due to their efforts to conceal their condition and
6 to suppress their instincts in the course of their every-day
7 activity among normal persons.

8 Lastly, -- and I think it is a very important reason --
9 perverts in key positions lead to the concept of a government
10 within a government. That is so noteworthy. One pervert brings
11 other perverts. They belong to the lodge, the fraternity. One
12 pervert brings other perverts into an agency, they move from
13 position to position and advance them usually in the interest of
14 furthering the romance of the moment.

15 This in large measure is a result of the bonds and loyalties
16 which exist between homosexuals and make them seek out, congre-
17 gate with, and support others of the same type.

18 From these elements that I have discussed I think it is
19 evident that a real security hazard lies in the susceptibility
20 of homosexuals to inducement to cooperation in espionage. The
21 use of homosexuals as a control mechanism over individuals
22 recruited for espionage is a generally accepted technique which
23 has been used at least on a limited basis for many years.

24 Mr. Pforzheimer. This part should be off the record.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

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1 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Some people would argue that relation-
2 ships between homosexuals involve no deeper emotional ties and
3 present no greater opportunities for blackmail than adulterous
4 relationships between a married woman and a man not her husband
5 or a married man and a woman not his wife.

6 There are some who argue that it presents a more difficult
7 problem to an unfriendly intelligence service to locate a
8 suitable companion for a homosexual than to provide mistresses
9 or sleeping partners to secure information from a normal
10 individual.

11 It is my feeling and the feeling of the experts in the
12 Central Intelligence Agency, who are well qualified in this,
13 that these latter observations are not correct. It is our feeling
14 that there are few, if any, cases where a pervert represents a
15 better security risk than a normal human being. The consistent
16 symptoms of weakness and instability which accompany homo-
17 sexuality almost always represent danger points of susceptibility
18 from the standpoint of security.

19 Furthermore, in view of the high incidence of homosexuality,
20 it is not very difficult to secure a suitable companion for a
21 homosexual, no more difficult than it is to secure a companion
22 for a normal person.

23 I would like now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
24 to cite a few more actual cases to try to back up the remarks on
25 the theory of this thing. I would like to say this off the

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1 record.

2 (Discussion off the record.)

3 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I would like to call the committee's
4 attention to a book entitled "To The Bitter End" by a German
5 named Hans Gisevius. That is perhaps the most brilliant history
6 of inside Germany from the Reichstag fire to Germany's collapse,
7 by a man who, though a civil servant and minor official in the
8 Gestapo and security headquarters, was himself a leader in the
9 numerous anti-Hitler plots and a collaborator with the OSS.

10 He describes in great detail the prewar attempt by Goering
11 and his cohorts to eliminate Colonel General Fritsch, who was
12 commander in chief of the German Wehrmacht, from the chain of
13 command and the position he held as commanding general of all
14 German armies.

15 Although Fritsch was not a homosexual, a case of perversion
16 was built up against him by perjured testimony. He was brought
17 before a military tribunal but was finally acquitted. However,
18 his career was ruined. They did get him out on that.

19 So that was an example of the Nazis using perversion in
20 their domestic matters to throw out a man who was not sympathetic
21 with the party.

22 This should be off the record.

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think it is of interest for this
25 committee to know, Mr. Chairman, that the use of homosexuality

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1 for purposes of recruitment, blackmail, and control has been a
2 frequent technique of the Soviet intelligence services. This
3 has been particularly true in their state security organizations.

4 It is known that for many years the NKVD and its predecessor
5 organizations in Moscow have directed intensive recruitment
6 efforts against foreign diplomats who have homosexual tendencies.
7 Standard operating procedures in these cases have been for
8 Soviet intelligence to confront these individuals at the
9 appropriate time with photostatic and other evidence of homo-
10 sexual acts, endeavoring to recruit them in this way by black-
11 mail. It is known that in a number of such approaches they were
12 successful.

13 This should be off the record.

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Mr. Chairman, a review of the
16 cases I have cited above, both in the field of espionage and
17 subversion, in each of which moral perversion figures prominently,
18 together with the thirteen broad basic points which I enunciated
19 somewhat earlier, set forth in my opinion a pattern and a series
20 of facts which I hope may be of some assistance to this committee
21 in this serious and vital investigation.

22 In conclusion, and supported by the data I have submitted,
23 it appears that the following points of major interest should be
24 considered in any investigation of the general subject.

25 These points are that the coercion and blackmail of

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1 homosexuals is particularly effective when homosexuality is
2 universally condemned and actively attacked by the society in
3 which the subject lives. A good example of that was Captain
4 Raedl. The Austrians looked down very much on that, and the
5 greater public opprobrium, the easier it is for blackmail and
6 control. The coercion and blackmail of homosexuals is par-
7 ticularly effective when laws against homosexuality are pro-
8 mulgated and enforced.

9 For example, take Nazi Germany. They had very strict laws
10 against it as well as the Austrians. Consequently, the fear of
11 exposure is strengthened, and blackmail becomes that much easier.

12 Finally, I would like to say that, in our opinion, the
13 moral pervert is a security risk of so serious a nature that he
14 must be weeded out of Government employment wherever he is
15 found. Failure to do this can only result in placing a weapon
16 in the hands of our enemies and their intelligence service, and
17 the point of that weapon would probably be aimed right at the
18 heart of our national security.

19 I would like to answer any questions.

20 The Chairman. Admiral, what would be your suggestion with
21 reference to the advisability of letting any homosexual be in
22 any Government service? Do you think they should be restricted
23 as to service altogether and, of course, eliminated from any
24 sensitive position? What would be your thought on that?

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Senator, certainly from any

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1 sensitive position they should be eliminated, and I think they
2 should be eliminated from any of them, because I do not know
3 when they might be given sensitive information or graduate up
4 to a sensitive position.

5 The Chairman. Are there any particular characteristics
6 by which one homosexual recognizes another?

7 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think there is, sir. I do not
8 know what they are, but from questioning a lot of them, one
9 homo can pick out another one. What traits they are, I do not
10 know. I could not do it. I have been told by numbers of them,
11 and they are always right -- "So and so is one of us."

12 The Chairman. Is it true that these homosexuals have
13 gathering and meeting places where they congregate in numbers?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

15 The Chairman. What effect do you think generally the
16 practice of homosexuality has on the will power and moral fiber
17 of individuals?

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that is a hard question to
19 answer, sir. I think that would vary in the individual as to
20 his own will power and moral fiber. Of course, certainly in
21 our society it would be a weakening in the moral fiber because
22 we consider it wrong. So I think it would be certainly weaken-
23 ing.

24 Senator McClellan. Under no circumstances does it add
25 strength.

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1 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I certainly could not see where
2 it adds strength. It may not always weaken, but it certainly
3 would not add strength.

4 The Chairman. Speaking of utilizing homosexuals for
5 getting information, which I can see would be very effective in
6 some instances, you always have to do that with a reasonable
7 allowance?

8 Admiral Hillenkoetter. With great care. You have to keep
9 controls on them all the time. You have got to use extraordinary
10 care and extraordinary precautions to be sure that they will not
11 jump the other way on you.

12 The Chairman. Are there any questions?

13 Senator McClellan. I have in mind just one thing. That
14 is, I am inclined to the view that they should not be permitted
15 to work anywhere in Government, with this reservation in that
16 broad statement, except temporarily in the services of the FBI
17 or your agency. This idea of, "Well, we can keep them out of
18 sensitive positions," just does not appeal to me at all. Any
19 time you expose yourself even to that extent you incur the
20 danger, as you have pointed out, of their either graduating into
21 positions of more importance -- and I am sure if they are in
22 Government, they are eternally seeking to advance themselves,
23 and under the laws, the general laws, they would have to be
24 advanced and progressed.

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

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1 Senator McClellan. Therefore, you would have to make some
2 exception there, and identify them, if you kept them out. Except
3 in possibly your agency, your division, and the FBI for temporary
4 employment only, I cannot see that we could tolerate them any-
5 where in Government. That is all I have.

6 The Chairman. Senator Mundt?

7 Senator Mundt. It seems to me in answer to the question
8 that the chairman asked, whether one homo could recognize
9 another -- and you said you supposed so, but you could not tell
10 how -- that was answered one time by a poet of somewhat lesser
11 stature than either Milton or Shakespeare, who said:

12 "Pity the fly upon the wall
13 Who hasn't any sex at all.
14 He cannot tell he from she
15 But she can tell and so can he."

16 That may be the answer.

17 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, that may be the answer.

18 Senator Mundt. I think you have answered rather well and
19 with great comprehensiveness and detail the questions we had
20 set out here, and especially the one about the reason why it is
21 dangerous to put a homosexual in an unimportant, non-sensitive
22 position, when you mention the fact that they tend to set up a
23 government within a government.

24 Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is a very strong tendency.

25 Senator Mundt. This clandestine comraderie they establish

1 necessitously brings to Government people of homosexual ten-
2 dencies. Even though you hire him as janitor, he tends to
3 bring in a fellow who might become chief of the division. It
4 is the specific purpose, you mention, as I understand it, when
5 you do hire on counter-espionage, a temporary basis, homosexuals,
6 you in turn have them shadowed and followed so you know they are
7 working for you and not for the other fellow; is that right?

8 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, no question about that.

9 Senator Mundt. Let me ask this one question dealing with
10 this fourth point in the committee's series of questions. As
11 far as we have been able to learn thus far, in the civilian
12 offices of government there is no system that has been developed
13 whereby each department in turn keeps its sister departments
14 advised as to homosexuals that have been removed, and so forth.
15 There is no uniformity in the business. Let me ask you this
16 now:

17 In so far as your relationships are concerned, because you
18 deal with the exterior periphery of our governmental activities
19 abroad, when you find a man in your shop or a woman of this
20 tendency, what system have you established for alerting everybody
21 else who might come in contact with those people?

22 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, when we find one who is here,
23 of course, he is allowed to resign. We ask for his resignation
24 immediately.

25 Then, as a control to prevent him from talking afterwards,

1 we tell him he cannot work for any other agency of the
2 Government or we will supply that agency with the information
3 that he is a homosexual.

4 But outside of that, we will not say anything provided he
5 keeps his mouth shut, and he does not talk, and he will come to
6 us if somebody tries to blackmail him, particularly if somebody
7 in a foreign embassy would try to blackmail him, he can come to
8 us for protection and we will stop it on that. That gives us
9 a control over that man where if he were discharged, fired, and
10 his name was put out as a homosexual, we would lose all control
11 of him. He could talk absolutely freely. That is a polite form
12 of blackmail we have over there. If he behaves, this will not
13 be known to anybody outside the Government.

14 Senator Mundt. What do you do to keep him out of other
15 Government jobs?

16 Admiral Hillenkoetter. If we hear he is applying for other
17 Government jobs, we say to that agency, "So and so has been
18 allowed to resign from us for that reason." Very frequently,
19 almost all of the agencies come to us, as they do to the FBI,
20 and ask when they are hiring a new person, "Have you any record
21 on him?" In that case we say, yes.

22 Senator McClellan. Does Civil Service come to you?

23 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Not Civil Service.

24 Senator McClellan. That is the source.

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Army, Navy, and Air come to us.

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1 Senator Mundt. Civil Service does not come to you?

2 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

3 Mr. Flanagan. To elaborate on that, what if a man is
4 allowed to resign from your department and it indicates on his
5 record he was allowed to resign because he was homosexual and
6 he goes to some agency of Government that at this time does not
7 give an employee a pre-employment investigation -- and there are
8 many agencies of that type. Would it not be quite possible for
9 such a man to gain employment without your knowing about it?

10 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Very definitely, yes, sir.

11 Senator Mundt. In other words, there is nothing done by
12 CIA to make available to all employing agencies a list of the
13 homos that have been discharged?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir, we do not do that unless
15 it is asked for. If it is asked for, we are glad to.

16 Senator Mundt. The only agencies that make a practice of
17 consulting you before they employ are Army --

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Army, Navy, Air, and State.

19 Senator Mundt. Have they made that practice over a long
20 period of years?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Since we were in existence, since
22 1947, when we started.

23 Senator Mundt. Does it apply to everybody employed by Army,
24 Navy, and State, or just officials of certain rank and importance?

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, it applies to everybody here.

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1 For example, it would not apply to -- well, even in that case
2 it does -- to an employee of a navy yard in Philadelphia, for
3 example. They send down and get a name check on the employee.

4 Senator Mundt. We found, for example, in working on the
5 Hiss case that one of the important factors was a colored boy
6 who carried a certain box in which they kept secret documents
7 from the office which housed Alger Hiss and Francis Sayre to
8 the code room.

9 If the State Department were going to hire a messenger boy,
10 do they first ask you: "Is there anything on him?"

11 Admiral Hillenkoetter. They do now. I do not know if that
12 has been the practice.

13 Senator Mundt. Ever since 1947, since you have been in the
14 business?

15 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, since I have been here. They
16 certainly do now.

17 Senator Mundt. Army, Navy, Air, and State always do that?

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

19 Senator Mundt. And nobody else ever does it?

20 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir. At times Treasury will
21 send over and say, "Have you any information about such and such
22 a man we are considering hiring?" With Army, Navy, Air, and
23 State that is standard practice, and the other bureaus and
24 departments may do it and may not.

25 Senator Mundt. Spasmodically the others?

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1 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

2 The Chairman. Senator Smith?

3 Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I have this one.

4 Admiral, do I understand that the CIA does have the
5 specific responsibility of detecting homosexuals in the agencies
6 you have mentioned?

7 Admiral Hillenkoetter. By no means.

8 Senator Smith. You do not have any authority?

9 Admiral Hillenkoetter. We have no authority. The only
10 reason they ask us is primarily that would be a very secondary
11 thing, primarily to ask us if we have any information on the man
12 derogatory or otherwise on loyalty or anything about his life,
13 and if we do have it, we will give it.

14 It is not our principal job at all to inform about homo-
15 sexuals. That is a Bureau job. We are glad to do it.

16 Senator Smith. Does the Bureau have specific responsibility
17 for that?

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes.

19 Senator Smith. Do you have any figures as to the number of
20 homosexuals who have been discovered by the Central Intelligence
21 Agency?

22 Mr. Pforzheimer. This should be off the record.

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 Mr. Flanagan. The staff has requested every agency of
25 Government to furnish statistics as to the number of homosexuals

1 that have been removed from the Agency and the number of cases
2 now pending. They will furnish that and we will have that for
3 the purpose of studies later.

4 (At this point Senator Mundt leaves the hearing room.)

5 Senator Smith. That will be a part of the record?

6 Mr. Flanagan. Yes.

7 Senator Smith. Have you ever tried to discharge or asked
8 for the resignation of any of these people who have refused?

9 Admiral Hillenkoetter. They have all given their resigna-
10 tions right away.

11 Senator Smith. No one has ever asked you to keep anyone
12 of that kind on in your Agency?

13 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, ma'am.

14 Senator Smith. Do you consider any other type of unorthodox
15 person to be as poor a security risk as the homosexual?

16 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think it would be a case of
17 degree. I think a perpetual drunkard or a man perpetually in
18 money trouble -- the man in financial trouble might even be
19 worse because he is more susceptible to blackmail. Excessive
20 drinking -- he would be very bad because he would be indiscreet
21 and talk too much.

22 Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very
23 familiar scene to see Admiral Hillenkoetter over here. He and
24 I worked with the Navy for a long time on the House side.

25 Admiral Hillenkoetter. When the Senator was in the House

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1 Naval Affairs Committee.

2 Senator Smith. Some of the investigations of congested
3 areas. I always found the Admiral very helpful.

4 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Thank you very much.

5 The Chairman. Senator Schoeppel?

6 Senator Schoeppel. Senator Smith touched on one matter
7 here I want to just ask a question on. From your experience
8 these individuals psychologically or otherwise addicted to this
9 nefarious practice -- do you find them as a group or as indi-
10 viduals indulging in other excesses such as, for instance, would
11 you find them sometimes associating themselves in the narcotic
12 group or habitual drunkard group or given to other excesses?
13 What has been the history on that?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I should say usually not, sir.

15 Senator Schoeppel. They are a class unto themselves?

16 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

17 Senator Schoeppel. Generally speaking, do you find them
18 of a finer and higher temperament as an individual goes or in a
19 little different, say, strata of society than the ordinary mine
20 run of the criminal or weak type?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir. You find them in all
22 strata of society. As the chairman said, you find them from
23 the messenger boy on up and down. I think they are not restricted
24 to any strata of society, but there seems to be a tendency if a
25 person is a serious drunkard, he is usually not a homosexual. If

1 he is a dope addict, I think practically never is he a homo-
2 sexual.

3 Senator Schoeppel. That is interesting. That is one thing
4 I wanted to know.

5 Now, the second question I wanted to ask you is: From
6 your experience here in the concentration of governmental
7 activities in the Washington area, which we are all fully aware
8 of, do you find any greater concentration of homosexuals within
9 this area than you would in other areas? I mean by that on a
10 percentage basis.

11 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think not, sir.

12 Senator Schoeppel. In other words, we do not find a
13 tendency for a greater congregation within this area?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I should certainly think not.
15 You find them in Boston, you find them here, you find them in
16 New York. I would doubt if there is a much greater concentration.

17 Senator Schoeppel. Now, third, in your investigations you,
18 of course, have to deal with police departments and men who are
19 ferreting out all the unlawful activities of individuals.

20 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

21 Senator Schoeppel. What generally have you found in
22 relation to the police records in relation to the homosexuals?
23 Are they generally pretty well screened, pretty accurate, or do
24 you find them a lot of times being, perhaps, a little over-
25 zealous in using that to further their investigations along other

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1 lines?

2 In other words, I would like to know how reliable you
3 find the ordinary police activity in relation to homos when
4 you go into it and have to use their records and their
5 information.

6 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think on the whole they are
7 fairly accurate, very accurate on that. The very nature of
8 the thing -- it is like murder. It is not done with witnesses,
9 and there is always a lot of circumstantial evidence. It is
10 very rarely that you catch people in flagrante delicti or any-
11 thing of that order, but it exists. I think the police records
12 usually are quite accurate on that, sir.

13 Senator Schoeppel. Now, the last question that I have:
14 You mentioned a while ago that obviously if you find one not
15 only in your department but probably in other departments that
16 come under your jurisdiction, you feel they ought to be dis-
17 charged and sometimes you do resort to the situation with the
18 individual wherein you say, "Now, so long as you do not talk,
19 we will not disclose this, but you can feel free to come to us"
20 -- as you have indicated -- "if someone attempts to blackmail
21 you."

22 In a degree, then, you build up in that individual a
23 loyalty to your department.

24 Admiral Hillenkoetter. We try to, yes, sir.

25 Senator Schoeppel. And nefarious as it might be, I can see

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1 the reason and justification for it. To what extent have you
2 found that loyalty manifested in these individuals to your
3 department? Can you say from your experience that the infor-
4 mation that they give you along this line, when it is traced
5 down, is generally accurate?

6 Admiral Hillenkoetter. It has generally been very
7 accurate.

8 Senator Schoeppel. In other words, you would feel that
9 it goes to the psychological reaction -- to my way of think-
10 ing -- that that individual, once he makes complete dis-
11 closures, is an individual that can be trusted to be fairly
12 accurate along the lines that he knows you are holding a club
13 over his head for?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, I think that is right,
15 sir.

16 Senator Schoeppel. So, therefore, it would make it an
17 extremely serious proposition for us to tolerate the continu-
18 ation of the employment of an individual in any agency of
19 Government that might be susceptible of passing or obtaining
20 information that might be of subversive nature to others?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, I think it is very
22 definitely a risk.

23 Senator McClellan. I have one or two more questions.

24 The ferreting out, discovering, and identifying of homo-
25 sexuals, is not a special assignment or responsibility of your

1 Agency, is it?

2 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir, by no means.

3 Senator McClellan. In other words, whatever your respon-
4 sibilities are, of your Agency, rather, in this connection this
5 is simply incidental to the general over-all responsibilities
6 you have?

7 Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right, yes, sir.

8 Senator McClellan. You have no special assignment or
9 project of trying to ferret them out in Government?

10 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir. We have nothing to do
11 with that, sir.

12 Senator McClellan. Now, whenever you discover one, is
13 there any other agency of Government to whom you report your
14 discovery?

15 Admiral Hillenkoetter. We give the information to the
16 FBI, to the Bureau, sir.

17 Senator McClellan. You give it to the FBI?

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

19 Senator McClellan. Do you know what record is made of
20 it there?

21 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir. You would have to ask
22 the Bureau people for that.

23 Senator McClellan. What I am trying to determine is
24 whether there is now in Government in a central agency or
25 repository for that information on all employees of Government.

1 so that if one were discovered and discharged from one agency,
2 there would be a definite source or record of that action
3 available to all other agencies of the Government.

4 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, I think the Bureau would
5 have that, sir.

6 Senator McClellan. Do you think the FBI has that in all
7 cases of the Government?

8 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think in all cases where any-
9 body has been discharged or allowed to resign on that, I am
10 sure they have that, sir.

11 Senator McClellan. Now, there is no agency of Government,
12 though, is there, that has that as a special and definite
13 project to ferret out these homosexuals in the Government and
14 expose them?

15 Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir, not so far as I know.

16 Senator McClellan. None exists now. It is just rather
17 incidental?

18 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

19 Senator McClellan. It is more or less of an extraneous
20 matter that just happens to come along and is discovered by
21 accident and not by direction of effort?

22 Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right.

23 Senator McClellan. Now, that seems to be the weakness
24 that we are undertaking here to find a way to repair and
25 strengthen. In thinking along these lines, I am going to

1 suggest to you -- in fact, request -- particularly of your
2 Agency and of the FBI and possibly the Civil Service and
3 others, the Department of Justice -- that suggestions be made
4 to us with respect to legislation establishing some definite
5 policy and procedure with reference to the discovery, identi-
6 fication, recording, and keeping a permanent record, so that
7 the information will be made available to every agency and
8 that every applicant for a Government position must clear
9 through that agency.

10 I should like to have personally -- and maybe the com-
11 mittee feels the same way I do -- your study of it in the
12 course of these hearings and a submission to us of the idea
13 of the proper set-up to deal with this thing effectively.

14 I could not write the legislation. I do not know just
15 where to start, but in the course of these hearings I hope we
16 will get enough information and enough understanding of this
17 problem that the committee can come out with remedial legisla-
18 tion that will offer a satisfactory if not a complete solution
19 to this problem.

20 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I should think the committee
21 would, after hearing all these people, be able to do it.

22 Senator McClellan. This is in the early stages, but I
23 want you to be thinking along that line.

24 Admiral Hillenkoetter. We will submit that to Mr.
25 Flanagan. If we had to write legislation now, we would

6
1 not know just what to put in.

2 Senator McClellan. I feel we will need the help of you
3 folks in writing legislation.

4 Senator Smith. Admiral, I understood you to say that the
5 CIA did not have the direct responsibility or the assignment
6 of such a responsibility, but that the Bureau did have, for its
7 own Bureau; is that true? I mean your Bureau, not yourself but
8 your whole over-all Bureau, it has the responsibility of find-
9 ing these people in its own Bureau; is that right?

10 Admiral Hillenkoetter. We try to find in our own agency --

11 Senator Smith. You do have that responsibility?

12 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes. It is an implied responsi-
13 bility. It does not say in law anywhere that we will look for
14 them, but we do it for our own safety and for our own security.
15 People who come to work with us, first we get an FBI check,
16 then we check with our own security people, and then after
17 they work with us, we keep a current check. After they are
18 once taken in, it does not mean that everything is dropped.
19 No law says we must look for them, but we try to find them.

20 Senator Smith. That is up to the Agency to do as it
21 wishes rather than by directive or by law?

22 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes.

23 (At this point Senator McClellan leaves the hearing room.)

24 Senator Smith. Would you think over the suggestion and
25 recommendation of a special agency, over-all agency, to have

1 jurisdiction over all Government departments when you are
2 thinking over the recommendations that Senator McClellan asked
3 for?

4 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes.

5 Mr. Flanagan. On that point, do you now feel homo-
6 sexuality is a sufficient problem, being a security risk in
7 Government, that it should be handled on a uniform, coordinated
8 basis throughout the entire Government?

9 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I should think so, yes. I see
10 no reason why it should not be.

11 Mr. Flanagan. To go one step further, do you feel that
12 the whole problem of security risks should be handled on a
13 coordinated and uniform basis throughout the Government?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Flanagan. On that point, one of the matters we will
16 have to develop at our next hearing -- as you know, under the
17 loyalty program it is handled on a uniform basis, and as you
18 further know, loyalty is merely one segment of security.

19 Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right.

20 Mr. Flanagan. In line with that, you do feel that
21 security should be handled on a Government-wide basis rather
22 than an individual agency basis?

23 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think very definitely on that
24 and particularly for the sensitive agencies.

25 Mr. Flanagan. One of the matters we are going to have

1 to discuss at a later time also is the method or the system
2 used in various agencies to investigate these people. You
3 feel that each agency should have an investigative force or
4 at least have an investigative force available to it, say
5 like the FBI, that could investigate these cases when it comes
6 to their attention?

7 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that the agency should
8 send them to the FBI. There is a very fine investigative
9 force already. I do not know whether it would be wise to
10 start a new one in each agency when you have one that is a
11 very hot-shot fine organization.

12 Mr. Flanagan. In other words, you think these cases
13 should be investigated by experienced investigators?

14 Admiral Hillenkoetter. Very definitely, yes, sir.

15 Mr. Flanagan. Just one point on that, one point that
16 has come up several times in my preliminary discussions with
17 people.

18 Do you find usually when a homosexual is caught or found
19 in an act of homosexuality and he is interrogated by intelli-
20 gence investigators, that he will admit that he is a homo-
21 sexual?

22 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think almost invariably so,
23 yes, sir.

24 (At this point Senator McClellan returns to the hearing
25 room.)

1 Mr. Flanagan. It is not too difficult an investigation
2 if handled by intelligent and experienced investigators?

3 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think almost invariably he gets
4 it.

5 Mr. Flanagan. One of the things we will have to consider
6 is the effectiveness of present laws and present methods of
7 handling homosexuals within the District of Columbia. I
8 noticed during your testimony you mentioned that the mere fact
9 that you are enforcing the laws with vigor makes these people
10 more susceptible to blackmail.

11 Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right.

12 Mr. Flanagan. Now, if we consider stronger legislation
13 in the District of Columbia or more intensive investigation
14 of this type of people, what effect will that have on the
15 people now in Government that might be susceptible to black-
16 mail?

17 Admiral Hillenkoetter. It will be a stronger effect on
18 them, there is no question about it. You have got to find
19 those people in Government and get them out.

20 Mr. Flanagan. By the same token, by having more rigid
21 law enforcement in that regard in the District of Columbia,
22 it would help to root them out of Government?

23 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think very definitely, yes, sir.

24 The Chairman. Admiral, a great many people come to the
25 Government from different colleges and universities. Have you

1 had any information or any occasion to know whether or not
2 homosexuality prevails to any extent different in colleges and
3 universities from that in the general public?

4 Admiral Hillenkoetter. I should think not, sir. I do
5 not know of anything specific on that.

6 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral, for your
7 appearance here. We appreciate your coming.

8 Call the next witness.

9 Mr. Flanagan. Colonel Howze. Will you give your name
10 and identify yourself to the reporter.

11 STATEMENT OF COLONEL HAMILTON H. HOWZE,
12 OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2, UNITED STATES ARMY

13 The Chairman. Colonel, what special activities do you
14 have in charge?

15 Colonel Howze. I am in the executive office of G2,
16 Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman. Colonel, you have a prepared statement?

18 Colonel Howze. Yes, sir. I was requested to present a
19 statement in answer to two questions. One is G2's views as
20 to the effect of subject type personnel on security in regard
21 to civilian and military, male and female --

22 Senator McClellan. Pardon me, off the record.

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 Senator McClellan. What is G2?

25 Colonel Howze. Intelligence part of the Army Department.

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1 Senator Schoeppel. The entire Army or any particular
2 branch?

3 Colonel Howze. The entire Army.

4 The Chairman. You may proceed and read your statement,
5 if you will, in answer to the questions.

6 Colonel Howze. Sexual perverts per se present a security
7 problem only, in our opinion, when they are employed in a
8 sensitive position or have access to classified information.

9 Because of their degeneracy of moral fiber, they are
10 susceptible to blackmail, coercion, or bribery. Any individual
11 manifesting any immoral or unstable character becomes a
12 security risk when he is employed on sensitive duty, but we
13 feel that that is especially true as regards sexual perversion.

14 G2 has always held to the principle that access to
15 classified information should be granted only to those indi-
16 viduals who are of excellent character and whose habits and
17 associates leave no doubt as to the trustworthiness of the
18 individual.

19 We were also asked to give information as to whether
20 foreign governments during World War II or currently are known
21 to consider or are believed to consider this type personnel
22 as vulnerable to foreign penetration of our security measures.

23 Our answer is that we have no information to the effect
24 that foreign governments have or are considering the homo-
25 sexual class as a special target for espionage purposes,

1 except there are certain individual cases which I am sure
2 Admiral Hillenkoetter documented, some of those, previously
3 this morning. We received reports of the German government
4 during World War II maintaining a list of homosexuals for
5 intelligence exploitation. However, we cannot turn up such a
6 list, and we do not have definite record of such a list. It
7 is also our opinion that too great a publicity in regard to
8 homosexuality within the Government service is somewhat
9 damaging or possibly may be damaging because it may further
10 open up to foreign agents the possibilities in this regard.

11 The publicity, of course, has exposed the situation some-
12 what and, therefore, an individual, we feel, is just that much
13 more likely to be a security risk because of it.

14 The Chairman. Colonel, how long have you been in charge
15 of this department?

16 Colonel Howze. I have been in the intelligence division
17 about a year, sir.

18 The Chairman. Prior to this time what was your
19 assignment?

20 Colonel Howze. Prior to that time I had a number of
21 assignments, all in the line of the Army, Mr. Chairman. I am
22 not a specialist.

23 The Chairman. In your various positions have you had
24 any contact with homosexuals in the service, run across them,
25 or has it been developed there with any homosexuals with whom

1 you had contacts?

2 Colonel Howze. In my own service, sir, I have known of
3 only one case which occurred in my own command. That was many
4 years ago.

5 The Chairman. Now, during the past year when you have
6 been in charge of this intelligence service, what information
7 has come to you -- I am not talking about individuals -- but
8 what information has come to you with reference to whether or
9 not there were any homosexuals in any of the departments over
10 which you have supervision?

11 Colonel Howze. We have no such information.

12 The Chairman. Do you think there is any great prevalence
13 of this homosexuality in the Army?

14 Colonel Howze. I do not, sir, any further than there is
15 in the average level of the whole United States. I hope
16 perhaps that our level is considerably less than that.

17 On the other hand, it is true that the normal individual
18 who comes into the military service is not subject to a loyalty
19 check. When they get to the point of being charged with
20 sensitive duties, then they are given various levels of loyalty
21 checks.

22 The Chairman. Senator McClellan?

23 Senator McClellan. No questions.

24 The Chairman. Senator Smith?

25 Senator Smith. Does anyone in your agency have the

1 specific responsibility of detecting homosexuals if they are
2 there?

3 Colonel Howze. No, Senator. There is a normal command
4 responsibility that runs throughout the Army for the individ-
5 uals under the command, and those individuals who have super-
6 vision over staff sections and over military units have that
7 responsibility, and thereby subject to the same regulations
8 and policy which does involve getting rid of this type of
9 individual.

10 Senator Schoeppel. Colonel, if I understood your testi-
11 mony correctly, you say that very, very few, if any, specific
12 instances have come under your direct observation.

13 Colonel Howze. That is correct, sir.

14 Senator Schoeppel. Is that because the general over-all
15 tendency of the military is not to look for it or do you
16 generally screen your men in these high level positions of
17 availability to security information so that you have pretty
18 well weeded them out?

19 Colonel Howze. I referred back to my service, Senator,
20 which has as a rule been as a line officer in the Army. I
21 have commanded units a number of times. Within the normal
22 run of military personnel there is no loyalty check nor back-
23 ground investigation in order to go thoroughly into a man's
24 character before he gets in the Army. If, after he gets in
25 the Army, he shows tendencies which are undesirable, as this

1 certainly is, then action is taken to get rid of him.

2 When it comes to the higher levels of the Army and work
3 which does deal with sensitive matters, then it is quite
4 normal to institute such loyalty checks as will turn up any-
5 thing of this nature and where it is turned up, then action
6 again is taken to get rid of this individual.

7 Senator Schoeppel. In other words, your statement that
8 it would be a bad loyalty risk or bad risk for the Army is not
9 based, then, upon any detailed study or analysis of records
10 you might have before you in your very, very short duration in
11 this present relationship that you occupy?

12 Colonel Howze. That is correct, sir.

13 Senator Schoeppel. That is all.

14 The Chairman. Mr. Flanagan?

15 Mr. Flanagan. Isn't it true, Colonel, that at the present
16 time and since approximately February of this year that the
17 three armed services are handling the problem of homosexuality
18 on a uniform basis, that they have uniform standards and
19 uniform methods of handling it, generally uniform throughout
20 the three armed services?

21 Colonel Howze. I have seen written statements to that
22 effect, Mr. Flanagan, but, on the other hand, that is not my
23 job and I would rather that you receive that testimony from
24 others.

25 Mr. Flanagan. We will take that up later.

1 The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.

2 Next is Mr. D. Milton Ladd. Mr. Ladd, will you give your
3 name and identification to the reporter.

4 STATEMENT OF D. MILTON LADD,
5 ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

6 The Chairman. Mr. Ladd, you may proceed with any state-
7 ment you may have prepared.

8 Mr. Ladd. Thank you, Senator.

9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation does not make policy.
10 Its responsibilities are to investigate and secure facts on
11 those matters assigned to it by legislative and executive
12 directive. Traditionally, the FBI has always been reluctant
13 to make recommendations or to express conclusions or opinions
14 which might be interpreted as recommendations. In response to
15 the request of this committee for its views on the relation-
16 ships between sex deviates and security the FBI, however, does
17 have certain definite observations to make based upon its
18 experience.

19 Security in the Government must embrace two considerations.
20 One, an awareness, consciousness and determination on the part
21 of responsible Government officials to take such steps as are
22 necessary and practical to insure security; and second, the
23 existence of personnel that is not vulnerable to outside
24 pressures which might be applied for a purpose and to achieve
25 an objective by forces inimical to the best interest of our

1 general well-being. The ultimate in the type of personnel to
2 be employed in Government service has never been more
3 accurately and forcefully expressed than by applying the old
4 adage, "they, like Caesar's wife, should be above reproach."

5 A public trust cannot be trifled with and in case of
6 doubt the American people are entitled to have errors on the
7 part of their officials, if there must be errors, resolved on
8 the side of caution. Insofar as the administration of the
9 Federal Bureau of Investigation is concerned, our rules and
10 regulations prohibit the appointment of even a suspect sex
11 deviate. Our rules and regulations on personal conduct are
12 such that should we ever learn that a member of our organiza-
13 tion has developed such an affliction, or should such an
14 affliction be undetected at the time of appointment, that
15 individual would be immediately separated from our services
16 when such information came to our attention.

17 As to the general relationship between sex deviates and
18 security, there are certain fundamental observations which
19 can be made. The crime of blackmail is almost as old as man.
20 The blackmailer always seeks a weakness in the life of his
21 victim and then sets a course of action to capitalize upon
22 that weakness. There are certain acts and events which
23 society has come to accept. A man can commit robbery, for
24 example, be convicted, sent to prison and later released. At
25 that time he has paid his debt to society and can start anew

1 with a clear conscience.

2 There are other acts not consistent with convention and
3 customs which have an effect upon the individual which cannot
4 be avoided like a crime. A criminal can always reform himself.
5 There is a serious question as to whether a sex deviate can be
6 cured. Then too, there has been a common fear of mankind
7 down through the ages -- the fear of sex expression. It has
8 been instilled in the minds of many from childhood as one of
9 the great "taboos." Therefore, any act which is not consistent
10 with that accepted as normal potentially is the subject of
11 social condemnation. At once, such an experience or tendency
12 becomes a closely guarded secret from other normal men. It
13 becomes the object of prey by anyone who would seek a weakness
14 through which to exert pressure.

15 To illustrate, a few years ago the managing editor of a
16 responsible paper embarked on a campaign of exposing certain
17 corruptive influences in his city. The underworld retaliated
18 after learning that the crusading journalist was vulnerable
19 as a sex deviate. They set a trap and sought to photograph
20 him in an unnatural act. When trapped, he vigorously fought
21 back but his effectiveness in that community had come to an
22 end and circumstances made it necessary for him to leave his
23 crusading and his job.

24 In another instance, a Government employee was blackmailed
25 by fellow employees when they learned of his unnatural

1 tendencies. Later this information came into the possession
2 of a foreign intelligence service. This service succeeded
3 in securing photographs of the Government employee in a per-
4 verted act and then sought to blackmail him.

5 The Nazis were notorious in their use of this technique.
6 In one case, a Government employee who had access to confi-
7 dential data was approached by a Nazi agent who demanded cer-
8 tain information. He told the Government employee that if he
9 did not comply with his demand, the abnormal tendencies and
10 acts of this Government employee would be exposed.

11 The Communists, without principles or scruples, have a
12 program of seeking out weaknesses of leaders in Government and
13 industry. In fact, the FBI has in its possession information
14 of unquestionable reliability that orders have been issued
15 by high Russian intelligence officials to their agents to
16 secure details of the private lives of Government officials,
17 their weaknesses, their associates, and in fact, every bit of
18 information regarding them, hoping to find a clink in their
19 armor and a weakness upon which they might capitalize, at the
20 appropriate time.

21 In considering the relationship of the sex deviate to
22 security, perhaps it would be of interest to observe how both
23 the Nazis and the Communists regarded such practices as far as
24 their own security was concerned. It is a matter of history
25 that Hitler's biggest purges included many sex deviates. The

1 Communist Party will quickly expel members who seek psychiatric
2 treatment because they at once are regarded as a security risk.
3 In one recent case the Review Board of the Communist Party,
4 which would compare with our Loyalty Review Board, expelled a
5 comrade on the charge of being a homosexual because they
6 regarded him as a security risk.

7 In conclusion, it would seem that the fundamental require-
8 ments of security necessitate that risks be resolved in favor
9 of the Government. In each case it should be fundamental that
10 all facts are taken into consideration wherever security is
11 involved. In days such as these, the stakes are sufficiently
12 high to warrant resolving doubts in favor of caution.

13 That concludes my statement, sir.

14 The Chairman. We thank you very much, Mr. Ladd, for
15 this statement.

16 Now, in your performance of duties with the FBI what
17 sort of information or what use do you make of such informa-
18 tion as may come to you with reference to sex deviates?

19 Mr. Ladd. Employed in the Federal Government, you mean?

20 The Chairman. Yes.

21 Mr. Ladd. That information when developed is furnished
22 by us to the Civil Service Commission in the case of most
23 Government agencies. In the case of military or naval, we
24 have a direct liaison with G2, ONI, and the Intelligence
25 Agency. We furnish it to them directly.

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1 The Chairman. Do the different departments -- Army,
2 Navy, Air Force, State Department -- have a practice of apply-
3 ing to you for reports on people who are to be employed in
4 those departments?

5 Mr. Ladd. Well, in connection with the loyalty program,
6 of course, all the Government employees' forms were checked
7 through our agency. I cannot say that the armed forces check
8 all of them. They do check certain ones that are holding
9 positions which would be considered security risks, but the
10 rank and file of the enlistees and others in the armed forces,
11 of course, are not checked with us.

12 The Chairman. When the checks are made by you on loyalty
13 checks, does that involve anything that you would find that
14 would be adverse to the subject?

15 For instance, suppose you should discover that he was
16 a deviate. You, of course, would report that?

17 Mr. Ladd. That would be reported. In a loyalty investi-
18 gation that would not be sought out because the loyalty
19 directive does not include an investigation for that purpose.
20 It goes merely to the loyalty and not to the security.

21 But during the course of such an investigation if infor-
22 mation is developed indicating such tendencies, that is always
23 included and forwarded to Civil Service.

24 The Chairman. In your report?

25 Mr. Ladd. In our report, yes, sir.

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1 The Chairman. Senator McClellan?

2 Senator McClellan. You mean you do not especially
3 examine into that character of conduct of an individual, but
4 if you just happen to stumble upon it, you report it?

5 Mr. Ladd. You have to draw a line, Senator. In the
6 background investigations in applicant type investigations,
7 yes, sir. We seek out that type of information. But in
8 investigating under the loyalty program we follow the provi-
9 sions of the loyalty directive as such, which only provides
10 for certain specific items.

11 Senator McClellan. And this is not included in the
12 loyalty check?

13 Mr. Ladd. This is not included in the loyalty check. In
14 fact, at the time the loyalty program was set up the Loyalty
15 Review Board raised a question with reference to reporting
16 such items as morals, and, so forth, and indicated that should
17 not be included in the loyalty reports.

18 So it was not specifically included unless it is developed
19 incidental to the other inquiry.

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1 Senator McClellan. The fact that they indicated they
2 did not want it included in your report would also indicate
3 to me that they would not consider it if it was included with
4 respect to loyalty.

5 Mr. Ladd. That is my understanding of it, yes.

6 Senator McClellan. In other words, if we indicate we
7 do not want this information, if it happens to get in the re-
8 port you give them, probably the information would not be
9 considered. That is the only thing I can see about it.

10 Mr. Ladd. Undoubtedly.

11 Senator McClellan. Do you not regard the character of a
12 homosexual, that element or quality in his character, do you
13 not consider that as having direct significance with respect
14 to his loyalty and whether he is a security risk or not?

15 Mr. Ladd. I would certainly consider him a security
16 risk, yes.

17 Senator McClellan. Well, of course, we use the terms
18 almost interchangeably because if a man is not a good security
19 risk, his intentions may be all right, but the harm he can do
20 might be equally disastrous as if he actually were disloyal
21 and intended to do it.

22 It is like a careless driver on the highway. He may not
23 intend to kill anybody, but he can kill just as many people as
24 somebody intending to kill if he is that careless.

25 I am trying to find out -- it kind of surprises me to

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1 find when you investigate as to loyalty -- the purpose of
2 investigating as to loyalty is to determine whether the man
3 is a security risk, is it not?

4 Mr. Ladd. The purpose of investigating under the
5 loyalty program is to determine his loyalty to the United
6 States, as set forth specifically in the Presidential di-
7 rective.

8 Senator McClellan. I understand. But the only reason
9 for our trying to determine his loyalty to the United States
10 is to ascertain whether he would be a good security risk in
11 Government positions, is it not?

12 Mr. Ladd. The application of the loyalty program, I
13 am afraid you will have to ask the Loyalty Review Board. I
14 would not be qualified to express a view on that.

15 Senator McClellan. I can hardly see any other reason
16 for it, if it does not go, after all, to the security of our
17 Government, and if this other element is a serious factor --
18 in other words, a person addicted to these practices is not a
19 good risk -- it seems to me the loyalty program, if there is
20 any great difference between them, should be broadened so as
21 to include this other factor.

22 Mr. Ladd. What application the Loyalty Review Board
23 makes with reference to such information when it is furnished
24 to them I cannot tell you. I do not know. But where we de-
25 veloped --

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1 Senator McClellan. At least, now, you have no directive,
2 your agency has no directive or responsibility for seeking out
3 and undertaking to develop information with respect to homo-
4 sexuals, but if incidentally you happen to come upon it, you
5 simply report it; is that correct?

6 Mr. Ladd. That is correct, with reference to the
7 loyalty program, yes, sir.

8 Mr. Flanagan. In other words, to clarify that one
9 point, isn't it true, Mr. Ladd, that the Federal Bureau of
10 Investigation conducts investigations under the loyalty pro-
11 gram in accordance with the loyalty standards that were set
12 up by the Presidential Commission?

13 Mr. Ladd. That is correct, yes.

14 Mr. Flanagan. Those standards merely go to loyalty as
15 such?

16 Mr. Ladd. That is correct.

17 Mr. Flanagan. For example, one of the standards is that
18 a man shall not be a member of the Communist Party or shall
19 not have had membership in certain named subversive groups.

20 Mr. Ladd. That is right, yes.

21 Mr. Flanagan. When you are operating under the Presi-
22 dential directive, loyalty program, you are limited by the
23 very Executive Order to a certain set of standards with which
24 you had nothing to do.

25 Mr. Ladd. That is correct. We do not make the policy.

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1 We are following the policy set down under the loyalty program.

2 Mr. Flanagan. On the other hand, if the F.B.I. under-
3 takes an investigation of an applicant other than a loyalty
4 investigation, then they would look to any defect in his
5 character; is that right?

6 Mr. Ladd. That is correct. Then a complete and full
7 investigation would be made with reference to all phases of
8 his background.

9 Mr. Flanagan. Could you tell the committee very brief-
10 ly the agencies for which you conduct applicant investigations?

11 Mr. Ladd. Yes. We make investigations for Central
12 Intelligence Agency, in connection with ECA, in connection with
13 Voice of America; we make some investigations upon request for
14 the State Department but not of all employees, only those they
15 specifically request.

16 We investigate, upon specific request, individuals who
17 are to be considered for special security jobs. If the War
18 Department asks us to check someone in the Secretary of De-
19 fense's office, we would make an investigation of that indi-
20 vidual. We make some special investigations for the Bureau of
21 the Budget upon a specific request.

22 The Chairman. As to all of those, you make a very full
23 investigation?

24 Mr. Ladd. That is a complete investigation, that is
25 correct.

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1 The Chairman. Senator Smith?

2 Senator Smith. Are the working relationships between
3 the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. good?

4 Mr. Ladd. Yes, I would say they are very good. We
5 have a daily liaison with C.I.A. as well as the other Intel-
6 ligence agencies.

7 Senator Smith. Does that include the Army, Navy, Air
8 Force, and State Department?

9 Mr. Ladd. Yes.

10 Senator Smith. And Atomic Energy Commission?

11 Mr. Ladd. Yes.

12 Senator Smith. In your opinion, should any one par-
13 ticular agency have the responsibility and authority on per-
14 verts?

15 Mr. Ladd. That is a question of policy that I would
16 rather not answer.

17 Senator Smith. What do you do with your findings? As
18 I understand it, you collect the information on these inves-
19 tigations. Do you make your findings known to other than the
20 Civil Service?

21 Mr. Ladd. Yes. For instance, under the Atomic Energy
22 Act and in connection with C.I.A., copies of the investigative
23 reports are furnished to the agency that is interested in that
24 individual.

25 Senator Smith. You do not make any recommendations

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1 along with your findings?

2 Mr. Ladd. We make no recommendations at all.

3 Senator Smith. Do you consider or does your agency
4 consider any other type of person in Government employ to be
5 as great or greater security risk than a homosexual?

6 Mr. Ladd. That is a rather general question. I do not
7 know whether I can answer that.

8 Senator Smith. We are investigating because we think
9 that the perverts are security risks. Should we be limited
10 to that one group of people?

11 Mr. Ladd. I would say that your perverts would be more
12 subject to blackmail than any other group, more subject to
13 pressures from outside.

14 Senator Smith. Thank you very much.

15 The Chairman. Senator Schoeppel?

16 Senator Schoeppel. No questions.

17 Senator McClellan. May I ask another question?

18 The Chairman. Of course.

19 Senator McClellan. Is there any liaison between the
20 F.B.I. and the Police Department here in Washington with re-
21 ference to homosexuals? Do you have any definite working ar-
22 rangements with them, or is it only in instances where you are
23 inquiring into the case of a particular individual that you
24 contact them?

25 What I am trying to determine is in these raids they make

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1 and docketing for misconduct and take a \$5 deposit and you
2 never hear of them again -- are those cases reported to the
3 F.B.I. by the police of the District of Columbia?

4 Mr. Ladd. We have asked the police of the District of
5 Columbia and in surrounding areas to in each case where they
6 make an arrest for a violation of this type and they found
7 that the individual is employed by the Government, to include
8 that Government employment on the fingerprint card when they
9 send it in to us, so that will be a flag to us upon its re-
10 ceipt.

11 We can send a copy of that arrest to the Civil Service
12 Commission.

13 Senator McClellan. Do they cooperate with you in that
14 regard?

15 Mr. Ladd. Yes, they are doing that now.

16 Senator McClellan. Have they been in the past? Has
17 there been that relation?

18 Mr. Ladd. They have been submitting fingerprint cards
19 to us in the past, but they would not indicate necessarily
20 Government employment.

21 Senator McClellan. How long has there been the pro-
22 vision of reporting?

23 Mr. Ladd. We made a specific request for that informa-
24 tion, I believe it was in April of this year.

25 Senator McClellan. Was that after some publicity had

8 1 been given to this state of affairs that we are now investi-
2 gating?

3 Mr. Ladd. Yes, that is correct.

4 Senator McClellan. Prior to that there had been no
5 liaison other than when you made special inquiry in a given
6 case?

7 Mr. Ladd. No liaison for that particular purpose, be-
8 cause the F.B.I. has no responsibility specifically to seek
9 out perverts in Government employment.

10 Senator McClellan. You do not have that responsibility
11 now?

12 Mr. Ladd. No, we do not now.

13 Senator McClellan. In other words, there is no agency
14 that now has that definite responsibility?

15 Mr. Ladd. That is correct, Senator.

16 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ladd. We ap-
17 preciate your coming.

18 Our next witness will be Captain Hylant. Captain, will
19 you please identify yourself for the record and proceed.

20 STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN E. P. HYLANT,
21 HEAD OF THE SECURITY BRANCH; ACCOMPANIED BY
22 J. M. BARRON, SPECIAL AGENT; BOTH OFFICE OF
23 NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

24 Captain Hylant. I am head of the Security Branch,
25 Office of Naval Intelligence, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy

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1 Department. I have had this job since the first of July, Mr.
2 Chairman.

3 The Chairman. How were you previously employed,
4 Captain?

5 Captain Hylant. I headed up the policy and control
6 section under O.N.I., dealing mostly with international rela-
7 tions and disclosure of classified information to foreign
8 governments and industrial security.

9 The Chairman. Do you have a prepared statement, Captain?

10 Captain Hylant. I have no prepared statement. I was
11 not apprised of what questions might be asked. I hope I can
12 be helpful to you.

13 The Chairman. Captain, we have been investigating the
14 question of homosexuals in the Government service, and we were
15 trying to ascertain the views of those in connection with the
16 service as to what kind of risks they are, whether or not they
17 ought to be in the Government service in any capacity,
18 especially whether or not it is dangerous to have them in
19 sensitive positions.

20 Any comment you might have to make on any phase of that
21 we would be glad to have.

22 Captain Hylant. The Navy down through the years has
23 felt that a homosexual is definitely a security risk in ad-
24 dition to being a moral risk for our boys who are cooped up on
25 board ship. I do not know whether you people have received the

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1 numbers we have gone into. We have a special section in my
2 shop headed up by a Mr. Mulligan, who unfortunately is sick
3 and cannot be here to answer specific questions from the
4 psychiatric viewpoint, and we do feel a homosexual is a def-
5 inite security risk not only in sensitive positions but we
6 are worried about them even in non-sensitive positions and we
7 have done our utmost and are continuing to do it, to weed them
8 out.

9 At the present time we have no known homosexuals in the
10 Navy. There may be one turned up this morning.

11 The Chairman. Now, Captain, what percentage have you
12 found or developed to be homosexuals in the service over the
13 years?

14 Captain Hylant. In our report, which I understand has
15 gone through, from 1941 through May, 1950, the Office of Naval
16 Intelligence has accumulated in a special file, which is used
17 only as an investigative aid, the names of 7,859 individuals.

18 This index has been acquired incidental to the investi-
19 gation of Naval and Marine Corps personnel, both uniformed and
20 civilian, all of whom have been separated from the service and
21 includes the names of the persons in other branches of the
22 Government and outside the Government.

23 This file contains the names of individuals who are all
24 known or alleged homosexuals and who are persons having had
25 connections with such individuals. Approximately 95 per cent

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11 1 of this total number resided within the continental limits of
2 the United States; a total of 1,740 as of May, 1950 were re-
3 siding in the Washington, D. C., area.

4 The Chairman. What was the total employment in numbers
5 during that period from 1941 up to 1950?

6 Captain Hylant. I could not guess. You see, that is
7 the wartime period. It is up in the millions.

8 The Chairman. But of the total number, whatever it
9 was -- several millions -- you had just 7,000 that have been
10 detected, something over 7,000?

11 Mr. Flanagan. That was not all Naval personell, was it?

12 Captain Hylant. There were 3,285 ex-uniformed Naval
13 personnel, 156 ex-civilian employees of the Navy. There are
14 1,117 members of other military services and civilian employees
15 of other Federal agencies, and 3,301 are civilians outside of
16 the Armed Services in Government.

17 I hope I am not confusing this picture here. Those
18 numbers are accurate from our figures. It is clear enough
19 for the record, is it not, Mr. Chairman?

20 The Chairman. Does that represent the total number of
21 homosexuals that you have ascertained to be in the total ser-
22 vice of the Navy and any other allied interests of the Navy?

23 Captain Hylant. Yes, that is all. We have carried
24 down through these years, as I checked into it, Mr. Chairman,
25 simply a card index of these people.

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1 Now, when we get requests from some command activity
2 such as the Bureau of Personnel or some commandant that he has
3 a suspect, our job, just like the F.B.I., is to put a complete
4 investigation on it, develop the facts, and let them sift this
5 evidence and decide what they are going to do with the man.

6 Officially they do not even have to report back to us
7 what they do. Unofficially they do tell us he is gone.

8 The Chairman. So, of these that have been discovered
9 over the years since 1941, they are all out of the service now?

10 Captain Hylant. As I said, we have no known homosexuals
11 in the service as of this morning.

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12 The Chairman. In other words, all that you have appre-
13 hended and about which you obtained information have been re-
14 leased?

15 Captain Hylant. Yes, whether uniformed or civilian.

16 The Chairman. Senator Smith?

17 Senator Smith. Did I understand you to say the per-
18 centage of uniformed employees was quite a great deal more
19 than the civilian?

20 Captain Hylant. Yes.

21 Senator Smith. Do you have that broken down as to
22 where they are found, whether on board ship or otherwise?

23 Captain Hylant. I do not have those figures with me.

24 Senator Smith. You do not have it broken down as to
25 the percentages of women and men, the difference in men and

as 13

1 women?

2 Captain Hylant. I do not have it broken down. I do
3 not know whether we have those records in the office or not.

4 Mr. Barron. Not broken down percentagewise.

5 Senator Smith. In numbers?

6 Mr. Barron. We have them broken down into numbers.

7 That includes both sexes.

8 Senator Smith. You do not have it broken down as to
9 the male and female?

10 Mr. Barron. No, we have not.

11 Senator Smith. Do you have the figures for the re-
12 cord on the numbers on board ship and ashore?

13 Mr. Barron. These figures represent over-all Navy com-
14 ponents.

15 Senator Smith. You do not have that broken down by
16 ship or station?

17 Mr. Barron. No.

18 Senator Smith. Do I understand, Captain, you have
19 specific responsibility of finding these people or only as they
20 are reported to you?

21 Captain Hylant. Only as a request for investigation of
22 a suspect comes to us. We have no organization that goes out
23 in the field and tries to develop these people.

24 Senator Smith. What is the procedure when they are
25 discharged? Are they followed up, reported to whom?

1 Captain Hylant. If an officer is discovered, the in-
2 vestigation discloses he is one of these unfortunate people,
3 he is allowed to resign and his resignation includes the fact
4 that he is resigning to escape general court martial. He is
5 flagged to the various agencies. These lists are held as con-
6 fidential as possible.

7 In the case of an enlisted man, of course, he could
8 elect to get a general court. Am I answering your question?

9 Senator Smith. Yes.

10 Captain Hylant. An enlisted man -- the Bureau of
11 Personnel or his commandant, if he was aboard ship or on some
12 station, would direct him to be discharged on conditions other
13 than honorable or could give him a general court martial. If
14 either one of them do not want to accept those conditions,
15 then they must stand general court martial. Very few of them
16 elect to take the court martial.

17 Senator Smith. But they all go out with a so-called
18 blue discharge or discharge without --

19 Captain Hylant. Under conditions other than honorable.

20 Senator Smith. So that is perhaps a protection to the
21 security, as far as other employment is concerned?

22 Captain Hylant. To get into other Government agencies,
23 yes.

24 Senator Smith. That would be against them, that dis-
25 charge would be held against them?

so 15

1 Captain Hylant. Yes.

2 Senator Smith. I think you have an admirable record,
3 if you can give us those figures up to as of this morning, and
4 you are to be commended.

5 The Chairman. If you could just hand those figures to
6 Mr. Flanagan, we will put them in the record.

7 Mr. Flanagan. Again I will state for the record all
8 the Armed Services are handling this on a coordinated basis
9 with the Department of Defense, and those figures will be
10 available.

11 The Chairman. Senator Schoeppel?

12 Senator Schoeppel. As I listened to your testimony --
13 see if I am correct -- you have a very definite feeling from
14 your experience that a homosexual should not be employed or
15 permitted to remain in any position of security in your or-
16 ganization or the Government; is that right?

17 Captain Hylant. I feel even deeper, that he should not
18 be in any position, even a non-sensitive position, from the
19 moral factor alone.

20 Senator Schoeppel. With that I agree. To carry this
21 one step further, do you feel that a man who is a homosexual
22 is not only a security risk but he is a very serious risk to
23 the loyalty factors that we consider as cardinal and as neces-
24 sary in practically all branches of government?

25 Captain Hylant. I would have to qualify my answer to

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1 that because I think I am incompetent to answer it. I do not
2 where you would draw the line between a bad security risk and
3 a man who might die fighting for his country, even if he were
4 a homo. I do not know, to tell you the truth. I certainly
5 would not trust him with any sensitive information because of
6 this loquacity, their abnormal unacceptance of responsibility
7 placed in their hands.

8 It is a hard question for me to answer. Have I answered
9 it?

10 Senator Schoeppel. Yes, you have. I was wondering,
11 from your experience how you would feel in this next step I
12 think we have got to take into consideration when this com-
13 mittee is determining this over-all question and its relation-
14 ship to the security of this nation and in its relationship to
15 the loyalty of the individual to this country, when he is ad-
16 dicted or when he is afflicted, if it is a psychological af-
17 fliction, with this abnormal tendency.

18 I think some place down the line we are going to have
19 to have some research or the benefit of some studies from men
20 who are qualified in that field, to give us some further en-
21 lightenment, because I think the two tie in to a degree.

22 Captain Hylant. Of course, undoubtedly a lot of my
23 thinking is predicated, Senator, on the fact of having been
24 commanding officer of a number of ships. I feel a definite
25 responsibility to the mothers and fathers of the boys aboard

17

1 my ship, and I do not want them exposed to homosexual people
2 on my ship.

3 Even if I thought they were loyal fighters, I do not
4 think they belong on my ship. That may be a selfish viewpoint,
5 but you live close aboard ship with your men, and you have a
6 very high respect for them and a close feeling with them.

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1 Senator Smith. That is an admirable viewpoint, and we
2 agree, I am sure.

3 Senator Schoeppel. My books do not change that attitude.
4 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Captain.

5 Captain Hylant. Thank you, sir.

6 (At this point Senator McClellan left the hearing room.)

7 The Chairman. We have one more witness, Lieutenant
8 Colonel McGarraghy.

9 Colonel, will you identify yourself for the record and
10 proceed, please.

11 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL F. I. MCGARRAGHY,
12 CHIEF OF THE GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION OF THE DIRECTOR
13 OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
14 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY
15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES HURLEY

16 Colonel McGarraghy. I am here to represent General
17 Carroll, the Director of Special Investigations, who had hoped
18 to be here but who was called out of town urgently yesterday.

19 The Chairman. Do you have a prepared statement?

20 Colonel McGarraghy. Yes, sir, I do.

21 The Chairman. You may read it, if you like.

22 Colonel McGarraghy. Mr. Francis Flanagan, Chief Counsel,
23 Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures, has
24 stated that one of the matters into which the subcommittee
25 will inquire during its investigation of homosexuality in the

1 Federal departments will be concerned with the homosexual as
2 a security risk.

3 From an analysis of the situation, it is apparent that
4 any homosexual who is in a sensitive position or has access to
5 classified material does constitute a security risk. The
6 reasons for this opinion may be summarized as follows:

7 A determination as to whether or not an individual is a
8 good security risk must take into consideration the entire
9 sphere of the individual's personal characteristics and
10 activities. We would have to characterize as bad security
11 risks persons who are of bad moral character (for example,
12 persons with criminal tendencies as evidenced by records of
13 conviction; persons who are habitually addicted to excessive
14 drinking); also persons who perhaps should not be stigmatized
15 as having bad moral character but nevertheless have personality
16 deficiencies such as lack of discretion as manifested in
17 excessive talkativeness on official matters with persons who
18 have no legitimate interest therein; and persons whose credit
19 reliability is not good because of failure to pay debts.
20 Persons who are emotionally unstable and/or of weak moral
21 fiber must be considered as bad security risks since, at the
22 very least, they may be careless in handling and discussing
23 classified information. Homosexuals are by their very nature
24 persons of weak moral fiber and they are likely to be
25 emotionally unstable. Consequently, on broad principles

1 homosexuals must inevitably be considered as bad security
2 risks.

3 There is always the possibility that a homosexual may be
4 blackmailed under threat that if he does not disclose certain
5 classified information his homosexuality will be revealed.
6 While it is known that many homosexuals do not have any shame
7 for their actions, it is generally true that they are most
8 anxious that their true character not be disclosed to their
9 friends and acquaintances who are normal people. Furthermore,
10 the possibility of blackmail would arise in regard to any
11 homosexual in the Air Force because of his fear that his
12 aberrations might become a matter of official knowledge, in
13 which event he would be subject to trial by General Court
14 Martial or, if not brought to trial, he would have to resign
15 for the good of the service or accept an undesirable discharge
16 in lieu of trial.

17 Apart from the possibilities of blackmail, an enemy agent
18 might establish a "love partnership" with a homosexual who
19 happens to be in a position of trust and through this relation-
20 ship might succeed in obtaining information of a classified
21 nature.

22 It is considered that the above comments are unquestion-
23 ably sound. However, during the two-year period that the
24 Office of Special Investigations has been in existence no
25 specific cases have come to light which would demonstrate

1 these points.

2 The Chairman. Thank you very much for the statement.

3 Senator Smith, do you have any questions?

4 Senator Smith. No, I think I have no questions.

5 The Chairman. Senator Schoeppel?

6 Senator Schoeppel. No questions.

7 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Colonel.

8 The committee will recess. I think we will meet again
9 on Wednesday morning at ten o'clock, when we will have some
10 more witnesses ready.

11 (Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned,
12 to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, July 19, 1950.)
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HR-M/SG 3/18/92

Mr. CHAIRMAN, AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

I AM APPEARING BEFORE YOU TODAY AT YOUR INVITATION,
TENDERED THROUGH YOUR DISTINGUISHED COMMITTEE
COUNSEL, MR. FLANAGAN. MY APPEARANCE IS IN CONNECTION
WITH YOUR COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF EMPLOY-
MENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER
MORAL PERVERTS.

AS THIS IS MY FIRST APPEARANCE BEFORE YOUR
COMMITTEE, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 102 OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947. THE AGENCY COORDINATES ALL OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND

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ALSO INCLUDES AMONG ITS FUNCTIONS THE OPERATION OF
AMERICAN CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ABROAD. IN ADDITION,
WE ARE CHARGED WITH THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL, THE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE
GOVERNMENT. THESE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
ARE OUR EVALUATED OPINION AS TO AFFAIRS OR SITUATIONS
ABROAD AND THE CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY. I
WISH TO STRESS THIS LATTER POINT IN VIEW OF RECENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE PRESS THAT THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOES NOT PREPARE EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ALSO
THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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ARE COMPLETELY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

WE HAVE NO POLICE POWERS OR INTERNAL SECURITY

RESPONSIBILITIES WHATSOEVER. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE

NOT A POLICY MAKING AGENCY. WE MERELY SUPPLY THE

FACTS AND OUR EVALUATIONS OF THESE FACTS, SO THAT

APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE

BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION UPON WHICH TO BASE NATIONAL

POLICIES. WE FEEL THE REASON THAT WE ARE NOT A POLICY

MAKING AGENCY IS QUITE SOUND, FOR IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN

THE CASE THAT WHEN AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DABBLES

IN POLICY IT VERY SHORTLY COMMENCES TO SLANT ITS

INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICIES IT FAVORS.

IN PRESENTING MY TESTIMONY THIS MORNING, I WISH

TO POINT OUT THAT IT IS BASED ON FIFTEEN YEARS

EXPERIENCE IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD. I HAVE SERVED

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AS ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE AND AS NAVAL ATTACHE IN
PARIS AND VICHY, FRANCE, AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
TO ADMIRAL NIMITZ IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, AND
SINCE 1 MAY 1947 AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING IS ONE
THAT IS OFTEN RAISED FOR CONSIDERATION IN INTELLIGENCE
CIRCLES.

ONE OF THE PRIMARY QUESTIONS RAISED BY SENATE
RESOLUTION 280 IS WHETHER THERE IS A THREAT TO SECURITY
INHERENT IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF SUCH PERVERTS, AND
WHETHER A SPECIAL THREAT IS RAISED BY THEIR EMPLOYMENT
IN SENSITIVE AGENCIES SUCH AS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY. IN ADDITION, AND BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, I
HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THE UTILIZATION

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OF MORAL PERVERTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN AN
ATTEMPT TO SECURE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE
EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS IS A SECURITY RISK IN THE
GOVERNMENT IS A VERY FIRM "YES". IN THE COURSE OF
OUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING, I WILL EXPLAIN MY REASONS
AS TO WHY I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS TRUE. PERHAPS THE
BEST WAY TO ILLUSTRATE THE POINTS I PROPOSE TO MAKE
IS TO COMMENCE WITH A STORY WHICH IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE
IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD OF THE VULNERABILITY OF
HOMOSEXUALS HOLDING STRATEGIC POSITIONS IN THE
GOVERNMENT.

IN 1900 THERE WAS AN EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT,
ENERGETIC, AND HONEST CAPTAIN IN THE AUSTRIAN MILITARY

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SERVICE NAMED RAEDL. AFTER HE HAD COMPLETED HIS COURSE AT THE GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY, RAEDL WAS ASSIGNED TO THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE AUSTRIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE FACT THAT HE WAS HOMEST WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, FOR IN AUSTRIA IN 1900 IT WAS THE CUSTOM THAT HALF OF THE GOVERNMENT MONEY APPROPRIATED TO THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS USED TO LINE THE POCKETS OF THE OFFICERS' THEMSELVES. AS A RESULT, THE SERVICE SUFFERED THROUGH LACK OF FUNDS. CAPTAIN RAEDL WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER OFFICERS BECAUSE OF HIS EXTREME HONESTY, AND HE UTILIZED ALL HIS FUNDS ON INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS INCLUDING THE PENETRATION OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE NETS IN AUSTRIA. DURING HIS FIRST TWO YEARS HE INFLICTED

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GREAT DAMAGE ON THESE RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE NETWORKS.
THROUGH NUMEROUS AUSTRIAN COURT TRIALS OF SUSPECTED
RUSSIAN AGENTS, THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
MANAGED TO IDENTIFY CAPTAIN RAEDL, WHO BY THAT TIME
HAD BECOME CHIEF OF THE AUSTRIAN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE.

HAVING IDENTIFIED RAEDL AS THE SOURCE OF THEIR
TROUBLES, THE RUSSIANS MADE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO
LEARN THE DETAILS OF HIS PERSONAL LIFE. THEY SOON WERE
ABLE TO OBSERVE THAT HE WAS NEVER SEEN IN THE COMPANY
OF WOMEN. THEN, THROUGH A YOUNG NEWS BOY, THEY WERE
ABLE TO DISCOVER THAT RAEDL WAS A HOMOSEXUAL AND HAD
MADE IMPROPER ADVANCES TO THE BOY.

THIS WAS THE TURNING POINT OF THE CASE. UNDER

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AUSTRIAN STANDARDS, NO OFFICER COULD BE TOLERATED IN THE ARMY IF HE HAD HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES, AND IF RAEDL WERE DENOUNCED HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. THE RUSSIANS DECIDED TO GET DEFINITE PROOF TO CONFIRM THEIR SUSPICIONS, AND THEY WERE ABLE TO SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER NEWSPAPER BOY WHO WAS IN THEIR EMPLOY FOR THE ORIGINAL NEWS BOY. THIS SECOND NEWS BOY WAS SOON ABLE TO CONFIRM RAEDL'S HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES.

AT FIRST THE RUSSIANS CONSIDERED DENOUNCING RAEDL IMMEDIATELY, BUT THEN THEY DECIDED TO MAKE BETTER USE OF THE KNOWLEDGE THEY HAD GAINED ABOUT HIM. DURING THE SUMMER THEIR NEWSBOY, WHO HAD BECOME VERY CLOSE TO RAEDL, SUGGESTED THAT THEY TAKE A VACATION TOGETHER AWAY FROM VIENNA, AND SO

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THEY TRAVELED TO A HOTEL IN THE TYROL WHERE, BY
PREARRANGEMENT, A RUSSIAN OFFICIAL ALSO TOOK A
ROOM. THROUGH THEIR BOY A COPY WAS MADE OF THE KEY
TO RAEDL'S ROOM; AND THEN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DETAILED PLANS MADE IN ADVANCE, THEY BROKE INTO
HIS ROOM AND CAUGHT HIM IN AN ACT OF PERVERSION.
RAEDL WAS IMMEDIATELY THREATENED WITH OFFICIAL
EXPOSURE BY THE RUSSIANS, AND THROUGH FEAR HE AGREED
TO FURNISH THEM WITH VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE TO WHICH
HE HAD ACCESS BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION. A WOMAN WAS
ARRANGED AS A SUITABLE CUTOUT FOR THE PASSING OF THIS
MATERIAL, SO THAT RAEDL WOULD NOT LEARN TOO MUCH
CONCERNING RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS IN THE EVENT
THAT HE SHOULD CHANGE HIS MIND.

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AS HIS FIRST ASSIGNMENT, RAEDL FURNISHED THE
RUSSIANS WITH AUSTRIAN MOBILIZATION PLANS TO BE USED
IN THE EVENT OF A WAR WITH RUSSIA. OVER A PERIOD OF
YEARS HE ALSO DOCTORED OR DESTROYED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS RECEIVED FROM AUSTRIAN NETWORKS WITHIN
RUSSIA. THE RESULTS OF HIS TREACHERY WERE SO EXTENSIVE
THAT AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1914 THE AUSTRIAN AND
GERMAN STAFFS WERE COMPLETELY MISINFORMED ON THE
NUMBER OF EXISTING RUSSIAN DIVISIONS.

TO ILLUSTRATE FURTHER HOW THIS TYPE OF CONTROL
CAN SPREAD, AT ONE POINT DURING RAEDL'S ACTIVITIES
AN AUSTRIAN AGENT IN WARSAW REPORTED THAT THERE
WERE INDICATIONS THAT RUSSIA WAS IN POSSESSION OF
AUSTRIAN MOBILIZATION PLANS. NOW, IN ORDER TO SAVE
HIS OWN SKIN, RAEDL DECIDED TO PLACE THE BLAME ON

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SOME OTHER AUSTRIAN AGENT WHO WAS IN FACT WORKING FOR RUSSIA. AS CHIEF OF THE AUSTRIAN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, HE KNEW WHICH AGENTS WERE SUSPECTED OF BEING DOUBLE AGENTS -- THAT IS, ALLEGEDLY AN AGENT OF AUSTRIA, WHILE ACTUALLY SUPPLYING INFORMATION TO THE SERVICE OF A HOSTILE SECOND COUNTRY. RAEDL ASKED PERMISSION FROM THE RUSSIANS TO EXPOSE THIS DOUBLE AGENT AND THUS SAVE HIS OWN NECK. BEFORE RECEIVING A REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS TO HIS REQUEST HE PROCEEDED TO TURN OVER THREE AUSTRIAN SUSPECTS TO THE AUSTRIANS FOR INVESTIGATION. THESE MEN COULD NOT BE CONVICTED, HOWEVER, THROUGH LACK OF DEFINITE PROOF. RUSSIA ULTIMATELY DECIDED THAT RAEDL WAS OF MORE IMPORTANCE TO THEM THAN THE THREE AGENTS HE HAD HAD ARRESTED,

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RAEDL MANAGED TO REPORT TO THE RUSSIANS, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, THE FACT THAT A RUSSIAN COLONEL HAD
OFFERED TO FURNISH THE AUSTRIANS WITH RUSSIAN
MOBILIZATION PLANS. AS A RESULT OF THIS TREACHERY,
THE AUSTRIANS PAID A LARGE SUM OF MONEY FOR A BATCH
OF WORTHLESS PAPERS, AND THE RUSSIANS LIQUIDATED THE
COLONEL IN QUESTION.

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AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, EXPOSURE USUALLY COMES TO THE DOUBLE AGENT, AND SO IT DID TO RAEDL. HE WAS EXPOSED QUITE ACCIDENTALLY AND QUITE INCIDENTALLY SHORTLY BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I, THROUGH CENSORSHIP MEASURES WHICH HAD BEEN PUT IN EFFECT BY THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT. BECAUSE OF THE TENSENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION MOST RUSSIAN NATIONALS WERE FORCED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY BY THE AUSTRIANS, AND THIS ORDER PRESENTED OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES TO THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. NOT REALIZING THAT AUSTRIAN CENSORSHIP CONTROLS WERE IN EFFECT, THE RUSSIANS ATTEMPTED TO SEND RAEDL SOME MONEY THROUGH A POSTOFFICE BOX. BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THE SUM, IT ATTRACTED AUSTRIAN ATTENTION. A WATCH WAS KEPT ON THE POSTOFFICE BOX AND RAEDL WAS IDENTIFIED AFTER

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PICKING UP THE MONEY. HE WAS PUT UNDER HOUSE ARREST
AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER COMMITTED SUICIDE.

NOW THIS USE OF A HOMOSEXUAL HOLDING A STRATEGIC
POSITION IS, AS I HAVE SAID, A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE
REASONS WHY A HOMOSEXUAL, HERE THE VICTIM OF BLACK-
MAIL AND FEAR OF EXPOSURE, IS A DANGEROUS SECURITY
RISK TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS
CONTROLLED RAEDL, THE HEAD OF AUSTRIAN COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE, THROUGH FEAR OF EXPOSURE OF HIS
PERVERSION, ALMOST COMPLETELY NEUTRALIZED THE
EFFORTS OF THE AUSTRIAN SERVICE AS AGAINST THE RUSSIANS
FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. NOT ONLY DID THEY HAVE THE
IDENTITIES OF ALL AUSTRIAN AGENTS IN RUSSIA, BUT IN
GAINING VALUABLE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND FEEDING
BACK DECEPTION MATERIAL AND FALSE INFORMATION THROUGH

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RAEDL, THEY PUT BOTH AUSTRIA AND GERMANY AT A
DEFINITE DISADVANTAGE AT THE OPENING OF WORLD WAR I.
THE RESULTANT INVESTIGATION CAUSED GREAT CHANGES
TO BE MADE IN THE AUSTRIAN GENERAL STAFF. THIS ALSO
WAS A DISTINCT DISADVANTAGE TO A COUNTRY ABOUT TO
EMBARK ON A WORLD WAR.

MR. CHAIRMAN, NOW THAT I HAVE SET FORTH A
CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE DONE TO A COUNTRY'S
SECURITY BY A HOMOSEXUAL STRATEGICALLY PLACED, I
WOULD LIKE TO TURN FOR A MINUTE FROM CONCRETE
EXAMPLES TO GENERAL THEORY AS TO WHY WE SHOULD NOT
EMPLOY HOMOSEXUALS OR OTHER MORAL PERVERTS IN
POSITIONS OF TRUST. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AN INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS,
I WISH TO LIST CERTAIN BROAD CHARACTERISTICS REGARDING

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THESE PERVERTS.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, AN ESTABLISHED HOMOSEXUAL
RELATIONSHIP INVOLVES EMOTIONS AS STRONG AND IN FACT
USUALLY STRONGER THAN A NORMAL LOVE-RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN.

SECONDLY, THERE IS THE KNOWN PSYCHOLOGICAL
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE PASSIVE HOMOSEXUAL -- SUSCEPTIBLE
PARTICULARLY TO DOMINATION BY AGGRESSIVE PERSONALITIES
IN ANY NUMBER OR IN ANY SITUATION.

THIRDLY, EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT PERVERTS
ARE VULNERABLE TO INTERROGATION BY A SKILLED QUESTIONER.
SELDOM DO THEY REFUSE TO TALK ABOUT THEMSELVES,
ALTHOUGH SOME WILL NOT INCRIMINATE ANYONE ELSE. IN
ADDITION, IT IS A FACT THAT HOMOSEXUALITY FREQUENTLY
IS ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESSES, SUCH

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AS PSYCHOPATHIC TENDENCIES WHICH AFFECT THE SOUNDNESS
OF THEIR JUDGMENT, PHYSICAL COWARDICE, SUSCEPTIBILITY
TO PRESSURE, AND GENERAL INSTABILITY, THUS MAKING A
PERVERT VULNERABLE IN MANY WAYS.

IN THE FOURTH PLACE, IN VIRTUALLY EVERY CASE,
DESPITE PROTESTATIONS BY THE PERVERT THAT THEY WOULD
NEVER SUCCUMB TO BLACKMAIL, THEY INVARIABLY EXPRESS
CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT COVERING OR CONCEALING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR CONDITION. THEY ALSO EXHIBIT
CONCERN AS TO HOW MUCH CIRCULATION THE INFORMATION
MAY RECEIVE.

FIFTH -- IN MOST CASES, EITHER CURRENTLY OR SOME
TIME IN THEIR PAST, THE INDIVIDUAL PERVERT HAS BEEN
PROMISCUOUS AND HAS FREQUENTED VARIOUS HANGOUTS OF
HIS BRETHERN, WITH THE RESULT THAT KNOWLEDGE OF HIS

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CONDITION IS KNOWN TO A NUMBER OF PEOPLE, WHO MAY
OR MAY NOT BE AWARE OF HIS SENSITIVE EMPLOYMENT. THE
COMPARATIVE EASE WITH WHICH BARS, RESTAURANTS, OR
NIGHT CLUBS WHERE PERVERTS CONGREGATE CAN BE
IDENTIFIED IN ANY COMMUNITY, MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR A
RECRUITING AGENT TO USE HOMOSEXUALITY AS AN EXCUSE
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CLANDESTINE RELATIONSHIP
WHICH CAN LATER BE DIRECTED TO ESPIONAGE PURPOSES
WITH OR WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT. IN THIS
REGARD, HOMOSEXUALS HAVE A DEFINITE SIMILARITY TO
OTHER ILLEGAL GROUPS SUCH AS CRIMINALS, SMUGGLERS,
BLACK-MARKETEERS, DOPE ADDICTS, AND SO FORTH.

SIXTH -- OBVIOUS HOMOSEXUALS WITH THE OUTWARD
CHARACTERISTICS OF FEMININITY -- OR LESBIANS WITH MALE

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CHARACTERISTICS -- ARE OFTEN DIFFICULT TO EMPLOY
BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON THEIR CO-WORKERS, OFFICIALS
OF OTHER AGENCIES, AND THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL.

SEVENTH -- SOME PERVERTS WHO MAKE A GREAT TO
DO ABOUT THEIR DISCRETION ARE ACTUALLY QUITE
INDISCRETE. THEY ARE TOO STUPID TO REALIZE IT, OR
ELSE DUE TO INFLATION OF THEIR EGO OR THROUGH NOT
LETTING THEMSELVES REALIZE THE TRUTH, THEY ARE
USUALLY THE CENTER OF GOSSIP, RUMOR, DERISION, AND
SO FORTH.

EIGHTH -- EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN US THAT EVEN
WHERE THE PERVERT HAS THE BEST OF INTENTIONS TO DROP THE
"GAY" LIFE AND GO "STRAIGHT", MOST HOMOSEXUALS
EVENTUALLY REVERT TO TYPE. I MIGHT SAY, PARENTHETICALLY,
THAT WE HAVE RECENTLY HAD SUCH AN EXPERIENCE IN OUR

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OWN AGENCY. WE EMPLOYED A MAN WHO HAD NO POLICE
OR PUBLIC RECORD OR RECOGNITION AS A HOMOSEXUAL, AND
THE MOST CAREFUL FBI FIELD INVESTIGATION DID NOT TURN
UP A SHRED OF EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THIS EMPLOYEE
WAS A HOMOSEXUAL. HE HAD MADE AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO
GO STRAIGHT AND HAD SUCCEEDED TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT.
HE HAD MARRIED AND HAD A CHILD. BUT ONE DAY NOT SO
LONG AGO AN OPPORTUNITY AROSE IN A PUBLIC WASHROOM
WHICH HE COULD NOT RESIST, AND ALL HIS EFFORTS TO GO
STRAIGHT WENT FOR NOUGHT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THIS
PERSON WAS SUSPENDED AND WELL ON HIS WAY OUT OF OUR
EMPLOYMENT WITHIN 24 HOURS. I CITE THIS CASE AT THIS
POINT TO EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT ALWAYS
EASY TO SPOT THESE CASES, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE
HAS BEEN A LONG EFFORT TO GO STRAIGHT, OR WHERE THERE

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HAS BEEN NO POLICE RECORD OR PUBLIC INDISCRETIONS.

WITNESSES ARE USUALLY LOATH TO DISCUSS THEIR SUSPICIONS,

EVEN WITH THE FBI. HOWEVER, SOONER OR LATER, A BREAK

IS MADE. ISOLATED LATENT CASES OF THE TYPE JUST

DESCRIBED, OCCASIONALLY DEVELOP, AND THEREFORE YOU

SHOULD NOT THINK TOO HARSHLY OF AN AGENCY IF ONCE IN

A GREAT WHILE A CASE OF PERVERSION SLIPS THROUGH FOR

A TIME AND THEN TURNS UP. SPEAKING AS THE DIRECTOR

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT

INSOFAR AS OUR AGENCY IS CONCERNED, WE LEAVE NO

STONE UNTURNED TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT WE DO NOT EMPLOY

MORAL PERVERTS OF ANY SORT.

TO RETURN TO MY CATALOGING OF REASONS, MR.

CHAIRMAN, AS TO WHY WE CONSIDER THE PERVERT TO BE

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- 22 -

A SECURITY RISK, REASON NO. 9 IS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO ANY SENSITIVE AGENCY. THIS IS THE FACT THAT HOMOSEXUALS ARE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO SEDUCTION BY ANOTHER PERVERT EMPLOYED FOR THAT PURPOSE BY A FOREIGN POWER. ACTUALLY, SUCH AN AGENT WOULD NOT EVEN HAVE TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL, BUT COULD SIMULATE THE CHARACTERISTICS AND GAIN ACCESS TO THE CIRCLE AND ACQUAINTANCESHIP OF THE PERVERT HE SELECTED FOR HIS VICTIM BY ACTING AS A MEMBER OF THE "TRADE".

TENTH -- CERTAIN PERVERTS ARE EXTREMELY DEFIANT IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD SOCIETY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO CHANGE THEIR HABITS. THEY FEEL THEY ARE DIFFERENT AND ON A HIGHER PLANE THAN THE HETEROSEXUAL. THIS MENTAL ATTITUDE CAN BE A VERY DANGEROUS ONE AS IT CAN BE PROJECTED TO A DEFIANCE OF SOCIETY IN OTHER

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- 23 -

RESPECTS, INCLUDING DISLOYALTY.

ELEVENTH -- HOMOSEXUALS USUALLY SEEM TO BE
EXTREMELY GULLIBLE.

TWELFTH -- EVEN THE MOST BRAZEN PERVERTS
ARE USUALLY UNDER CONSIDERABLE TENSION DUE TO THEIR
EFFORTS TO CONCEAL THEIR CONDITION AND TO SURPRESS
THEIR INSTINCTS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR EVERY-DAY
ACTIVITY AMONG NORMAL PERSONS.

THIRTEENTH -- AND LAST, BUT NOT LEAST, FOR I
BELIEVE THIS ONE TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO THE
WORK OF THIS COMMITTEE -- PERVERTS IN KEY POSITIONS
LEAD TO THE CONCEPT OF A "GOVERNMENT WITHIN A
GOVERNMENT". THEY BRING OTHER PERVERTS INTO AN
AGENCY, MOVE THEM FROM POSITION TO POSITION, AND

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- 24 -

ADVANCE THEM, USUALLY IN THE INTEREST OF FURTHERING THE ROMANCE OF THE MOMENT. THIS IS IN LARGE MEASURE THE RESULT OF THE STRONG BONDS AND LOYALTIES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN HOMOSEXUALS, AND WHICH MAKES THEM SEEK OUT, CONGREGATE WITH AND SUPPORT OTHERS OF THE SAME TYPE.

IT CAN BE NOTED FROM THE THIRTEEN ELEMENTS THAT I HAVE DISCUSSED ABOVE THAT A REAL SECURITY HAZARD LIES IN THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF HOMOSEXUALS TO INDUCEMENT TO COOPERATION IN ESPIONAGE. THE USE OF HOMOSEXUALS AS A CONTROL MECHANISM OVER INDIVIDUALS RECRUITED FOR ESPIONAGE IS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED TECHNIQUE WHICH HAS BEEN USED AT LEAST ON A LIMITED BASIS FOR MANY YEARS. I MIGHT SAY PARENTHETICALLY

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- 25 -

AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THAT WHILE THIS
 AGENCY WILL NEVER EMPLOY A HOMOSEXUAL ON ITS ROLLS,
 IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE NECESSARY, AND IN THE PAST HAS
 ACTUALLY BEEN VALUABLE, TO USE KNOWN HOMOSEXUALS
 AS AGENTS IN THE FIELD. I AM CERTAIN THAT IF JOSEPH
 STALIN OR A MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OR A HIGH
 SATELLITE OFFICIAL WERE KNOWN TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL,
 NO MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE OR OF THE CONGRESS WOULD
 BALK AGAINST OUR USE OF ANY TECHNIQUE TO PENETRATE
 THEIR OPERATIONS, PROVIDED THAT WE SURROUNDED OUR
 AGENT WITH THE PROPER SAFEGUARDS. AFTER ALL,
 INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE IS AT BEST AN EXTREMELY
 DIRTY BUSINESS. HOWEVER, WHERE WE MAKE USE OF SUCH
 CONTROL MECHANISMS, WE DO SO WITH FULL REALIZATION
 OF THE SECURITY FACTORS INVOLVED, AND WE EXERCISE

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- 26 -

APPROPRIATE CONTROLS.

THERE ARE THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUALS INVOLVE NO DEEPER EMOTIONAL TIES AND PRESENT NO GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR BLACKMAIL THAN ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A MARRIED WOMAN AND A MAN NOT HER HUSBAND, OR A MARRIED MAN AND A WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE. THERE ARE SOME WHO ARGUE THAT IT PRESENTS A MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM TO AN UNFRIENDLY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO LOCATE A SUITABLE COMPANION FOR A HOMOSEXUAL THAN TO PROVIDE MISTRESSES OR SLEEPING PARTNERS TO SECURE INFORMATION FROM A NORMAL INDIVIDUAL. IT IS MY FEELING, AND THE FEELING OF THE EXPERTS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THAT THESE LATTER OBSERVATIONS

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- 27 -

ARE NOT CORRECT. IT IS OUR FEELING THAT THERE ARE
FEW IF ANY CASES WHERE A PERVERT REPRESENTS A
BETTER SECURITY RISK THAN A NORMAL HUMAN BEING. AS
I POINTED OUT ABOVE, THE CONSISTENT SYMPTOMS OF
WEAKNESS AND INSTABILITY WHICH ACCOMPANY HOMOSEXUALITY
ALMOST ALWAYS REPRESENT DANGER POINTS OF SUSCEPTIBILITY
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SECURITY. FURTHERMORE, IN
VIEW OF THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF HOMOSEXUALITY, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT SECURING A SUITABLE COM-
PANION FOR A HOMOSEXUAL REPRESENTS A VERY DIFFICULT
PROBLEM TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ON THE SEARCH FOR
SUCH AN INDIVIDUAL.

MR. CHAIRMAN, HAVING SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ON
GENERALITIES, AND KNOWING THAT THIS COMMITTEE IS

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- 28 -

INTERESTED IN THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF UTILIZATION OF
HOMOSEXUALS BY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS,
I WOULD LIKE NOW, WITH YOUR PERMISSION AND THAT OF
THE COMMITTEE, TO CITE JUST A FEW MORE ACTUAL CASES
TO LEND SOME SUBSTANCE TO MY PREVIOUS REMARKS.

Now go off the record.
TO BEGIN WITH, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY STATEMENTS

IN THE PRESS TO THE GENERAL EFFECT THAT HITLER WAS
SUPPOSED TO HAVE AMASSED THE NAMES OF HOMOSEXUALS
AROUND THE WORLD, AND PARTICULARLY THE NAMES OF
HOMOSEXUALS WHO WERE HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
BOTH ALLIED AND AXIS. THIS LIST HAS EVEN BEEN RUMORED
TO BE IN THE PRESENT POSSESSION OF THE RUSSIANS. THIS
RUMOR WAS GIVEN ADDED CREDENCE BY ITS INCLUSION IN
THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE MATTER OF
MORAL PERVERSION BY THE JUNIOR SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA.

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- 29 -

I CAN ONLY SAY TO THE COMMITTEE THAT WE HAVE HEARD RUMORS OF SUCH A LIST, BUT HAVE NEVER SEEN IT. WE HAVE NEVER KNOWN ANYBODY WHO HAS SEEN IT. REPORTS CONCERNING THIS LIST ARE ALWAYS SECOND OR THIRD HAND, AND IT HAS NOT TURNED UP, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, IN ANY OF THE DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY THE MILITARY SERVICES, OR OSS, OR ANY OTHER GROUPS IN GERMANY AFTER THE WAR. WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A LIST EXISTED, IT IS TRUE THAT THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES MADE USE OF HOMOSEXUALS WHEREVER IT SUITED THEIR PURPOSE. THEY MADE EXTENDED USE OF HOMOSEXUAL INCLINATIONS IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION AND STRENGTHEN THE PARTY. I CALL THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION TO A BOOK ENTITLED "TO THE BITTER END", BY A GERMAN NAMED HANS GISEVIUS, PERHAPS

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- 30 -

THE MOST BRILLIANT HISTORY OF INSIDE GERMANY FROM
THE REICHSTAG FIRE TO GERMANY'S COLLAPSE, BY A MAN
WHO, THOUGH A CIVIL SERVANT AND MINOR OFFICIAL IN
THE GESTAPO AND SECURITY HEADQUARTERS, WAS HIMSELF
A LEADER IN THE NUMEROUS ANTI-HITLER PLOTS, AND A
COLLABORATOR WITH THE OSS. IN CHAPTER 6 OF "TO THE
BITTER END", GISEVIUS DESCRIBES IN GREAT DETAIL THE
PRE-WAR ATTEMPT BY GOERING AND HIS COHORTS TO
ELIMINATE COLONEL GENERAL FRITSCH FROM THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND AND THE POSITION HE HELD AS COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE GERMAN ARMIES. ALTHOUGH FRITSCH
WAS NOT A HOMOSEXUAL, A CASE OF PERVERSION WAS BUILT
UP AGAINST HIM BY PERJURED TESTIMONY. HE WAS BROUGHT
BEFORE A MILITARY TRIBUNAL, BUT WAS FINALLY ACQUITTED

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- 31 -

WHEN THE EVIDENCE BROKE DOWN. HIS CAREER, HOWEVER,
WAS RUINED. THIS SHOWS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE
GERMANS WENT IN THE USE OF HOMOSEXUALS TO ACHIEVE
DOMESTIC CONTROL. I WOULD RECOMMEND, MR. CHAIRMAN,
THAT THIS CHAPTER BE MADE A PART OF THE RECORD IN
THESE HEARINGS FOR ALL TO SEE.

IN ANOTHER INSTANCE DURING WORLD WAR II, A
GERMAN ABWEHR AGENT, A FORMER OLYMPIC SWIMMER,
WAS SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING THE NOTEBOOK OF AN ALLIED
AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL. THE NOTEBOOK WAS OF SUCH
IMPORTANCE THAT THIS ALLIED POWER CONSIDERED ITS
RECOVERY TO BE ESSENTIAL. THROUGH THEIR INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE THEY DISCOVERED THAT THE GERMAN AGENT WAS
A HOMOSEXUAL, AND THROUGH THE EXPLOITATION OF THIS

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- 32 -

FACTOR THEY WERE ABLE TO RECOVER THE NOTEBOOK.

IN ANOTHER NOTORIOUS CASE DURING THE PAST WAR, AN AMBASSADOR OF AN ALLIED NATION STATIONED IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DISCOVERED BY THE GERMANS TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL. THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN PLANTING AS HIS BUTLER AND HANDY MAN AN ALBANIAN HOMOSEXUAL, WHO MANAGED TO GAIN THE AMBASSADOR'S CONFIDENCE AND AFFECTION THROUGH HIS ILLICIT ADVANCES. AS A RESULT OF HIS TRUSTED POSITION, THE BUTLER WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN A KEY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S SAFE ON BEHALF OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WHICH THEN PHOTOSTATED ALL THE DOCUMENTS PLACED IN THE SAFE.

DURING WORLD WAR II, THREE INDIVIDUALS WERE TRIED FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL ESPIONAGE ON BEHALF OF ENGLAND BY THE ITALIAN SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

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- 33 -

DEFENSE OF THE STATE. ALL THREE INDIVIDUALS WERE
 CONFIRMED HOMOSEXUALS, AS WAS THEIR CUTOUT, AN
 IMPORTANT SWISS OFFICIAL STATIONED IN ROME. THE
 PRINCIPAL AGENT WAS RECRUITED FOR INTELLIGENCE
 WORK BY THE SWISS, WHO WAS A FRIEND OF LONG STANDING.
 HE IN TURN ENTERED INTO INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH
 THE TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS, ONE A GERMAN AND ONE
 AN ITALIAN. USING PERVERSION AS A CONTROL MECHANISM,
 AND THUS CONTROLLING THEM EMOTIONALLY, THE SENIOR
 AGENT WAS SOON ABLE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION OF
 ESPIONAGE VALUE. ALTHOUGH THE SUB-AGENTS IN THEIR
 TESTIMONY DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR INFORMATION
 WAS BEING TRANSMITTED TO A FOREIGN POWER, THE PRINCIPAL
 AGENT TESTIFIED THAT THEY WERE BOTH AWARE OF THE PURPOSE
 OF THEIR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

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- 34 -

I THINK IT IS OF INTEREST FOR THIS COMMITTEE TO
 KNOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE USE OF HOMOSEXUALITY
 FOR PURPOSES OF RECRUITMENT, BLACKMAIL, AND CONTROL
 HAS BEEN A FREQUENT TECHNIQUE OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
 SERVICES. THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THEIR
 STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS. IT IS KNOWN THAT FOR
 MANY YEARS THE MGB AND ITS PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATIONS
 IN MOSCOW HAVE DIRECTED INTENSIVE RECRUITMENT EFFORTS
 AGAINST FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WHO HAVE HOMOSEXUAL
 TENDENCIES. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES IN THESE
 CASES HAVE BEEN FOR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TO CONFRONT
 THESE INDIVIDUALS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WITH
 PHOTOSTATIC AND OTHER EVIDENCE OF HOMOSEXUAL ACTS,
 ENDEAVORING TO RECRUIT THEM IN THIS WAY BY BLACKMAIL.

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- 35 -

IT IS KNOWN THAT A NUMBER OF SUCH APPROACHES TO
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL
IN PAST YEARS.

AN INTERESTING CASE WHICH IS PRESENTLY UNDER
OBSERVATION BY US IS THAT OF A KNOWN HOMOSEXUAL
ATTACHED TO AN ALLIED EMBASSY IN A FOREIGN CAPITOL.
THIS ATTACHE HAS BEEN SEEN FREQUENTLY OUT ALONE WITH
A SOVIET OFFICER WHO IS SUSPECTED OF HOMOSEXUAL
TENDENCIES. WHILE IT IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT IN
THESE CASES TO TELL WHO IS ATTEMPTING TO SUBVERT WHOM,
IT LOOKS IN THIS INSTANCE AS IF THE ALLIES WERE ATTEMPT-
ING TO SUBVERT A RUSSIAN OFFICER FOR INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSES.

IN ONE CASE IN WHICH WERE WERE INTERESTED ABROAD
IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THIS YEAR, WE FOUND WHAT I

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- 36 -

BELIEVE TO REPRESENT A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATION,
AND WE BELIEVE THAT OUR TASK WILL BE MADE CONSIDERABLY
EASIER BY THE APPEARANCE IN THE AREA OF A KNOWN HOMO-
SEXUAL WHO WE THINK WILL BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN THIS
PARTICULAR CASE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, A REVIEW OF THE FEW CASES WHICH
I HAVE CITED ABOVE, BOTH IN THE FIELD OF ESPIONAGE AND
SUBVERSION, IN EACH OF WHICH MORAL PER VERSION FIGURES
PROMINENTLY, TOGETHER WITH THE THIRTEEN BROAD BASIC
POINTS WHICH I ENUNCIATED SOMEWHAT EARLIER, SET FORTH
IN MY OPINION A PATTERN AND A SERIES OF FACTS WHICH I
HOPE MAY BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO THIS COMMITTEE IN
THIS SERIOUS AND VITAL INVESTIGATION.

IN CONCLUSION, AND SUPPORTED BY THE DATA I HAVE

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- 37 -

SUBMITTED, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ANY INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF HOMOSEXUALS. THESE POINTS ARE THAT THE COERCION AND BLACKMAIL OF HOMOSEXUALS IS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE WHEN HOMOSEXUALITY IS UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED AND ACTIVELY ATTACKED BY THE SOCIETY IN WHICH THE SUBJECT LIVES. THIS WAS WELL ILLUSTRATED BY THE CASE OF CAPTAIN RAEDL, THE AUSTRIAN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, WHICH I CITED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ALL TOO LENGTHY TESTIMONY. SECONDLY, THE COERCION AND BLACKMAIL OF HOMOSEXUALS IS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE WHEN LAWS AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY ARE PROMULGATED AND ENFORCED. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN NAZI GERMANY WHERE SUCH LAWS GAVE THE NAZIS A POWERFUL PRESSURE WEAPON. NEVERTHELESS, THE SECURITY

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- 38 -

FACTORS ARE SUCH THAT MORAL PERVERSION MUST BE
UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED AND ACTIVELY ATTACKED BY OUR
SOCIETY, AND LAWS AGAINST MORAL PERVERSION MUST BE
PROMULGATED AND RIGIDLY ENFORCED.

I WOULD SAY, FINALLY, AND WITH DEEP APPRECIATION
FOR THE SERIOUS ATTENTION WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN TO THESE
REMARKS AND TO THIS TESTIMONY, THAT IN OUR OPINION THE
MORAL PERVERT IS A SECURITY RISK OF SO SERIOUS A NATURE
THAT HE MUST BE WEEDED OUT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
WHEREVER HE IS FOUND. THE FAILURE TO DO THIS CAN ONLY
RESULT IN PLACING A DAGGER IN THE HANDS OF OUR ENEMIES
AND THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND THE POINT OF THAT
DAGGER WOULD LIE AT THE HEART OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

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